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Abstract 
The major objective of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive decision sup 
port system (DSS) for systernatically studying real-world strategic conflicts. The 
main components include the design and implementation of flexible interfaces for 
formulation and interpretation; construction of novel algonthms for modeling and 
andyzing small, medium and largescale confiicts; development of new theoretical 
icleas in conflict resolution such as an innovative approach to coalition analysis; and 
incorporation of these new concepts into the DSS. The DSS is based upon esisting 
iiiitl riew research developments for the Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution, and 
is referred to as GAICR II. 
The option form is improved and extensiveiy utilized to represent a conflict in 
terms of decision makea, options and preferences. Specially designed data struc- 
tures and corresponding algorithms are implemented for generating possible states, 
removing infeasible states, coalescing indistinguishable states, and modeling allow 
ihle state transitions. For small disputes, a gaph-based approach to modeling a 
coiiflict is suggested as an input format. Algorithms based on different approaches 
tu facilit ate preference elicitation are designed and implernented. hloreover, the 
DSS permits the choices of dinerent decision makers in a mode1 to be analyzed 
tising different behavior patterns or solution concepts. A range of useN follow-up 
analyses allows m. "mhat if" questions to be investigated and thereby provides 
an enhanced understanding of the confikt under study, which should in turn Iead 
t O bet t er decisions. 
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-1 conpict is a clash of 
Codict s 
interests, values, actions, or directions [li] . The word 
roiiflict is applicable from the instant that the clash occurs. Confiict in various 
foniis caii be found al1 around us, in international relations, in politics. in economic 
ro~iipetition. and in relat.ionships between individuals. Though the most obt-ious 
types of GconRictP may be thought to be wars, revolutions, riots, strikes, and 
Iiostilities of other sorts. However, conAict in a more general sense is a natural 
ronsequence of one's power to take actions that affect others 171. Even when we say 
tliat there is a potential confkt, we are implying that there is already a conflict of 
interest or goals, although an explicit clash may not have occurred yet. 
Decision situations involving conflicts are known as "interactive" decisions, 
ahich involve several parties, each with a stake in the outcorne, and some power to 
affect it. These parties' aims and interests usudy 
in total opposition, they are trying to bring about 
Mer:  though they rnay not be 
different outcornes. The crucial 
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point is that no one actor has complete control of events. Each must try to take 
iiito account - and if possible, influence - the others' possible actions [8]. Their 
clecisions thus "interact" with each other. In fact, Sage [79] points out that in these 
situations, "nature is replaced by not necessarily hostile opponents" , and "people's 
reactions to each other's actions are of great importancen. 
More specifically, strategic conpicts refer to decision problems involving two or 
more decision makers (DMs) [54]. Each DM must select among two or more courses 
O/ mtion and the final outcome depends on the choica of al1 DMs. -4 conflict exists 
iri the sense that DMs have different prefermces over the possible final outcornes, 
i.e. their preference rankings are not identical. 
Strategic conflicts are so pervasive that they c m  be foiind in virtuaüy every 
srea of human interaction. As pointed out by De Bono [l?, page 1681, "Conflict 
rrsoliition is probably the rnost important area for the future of mankind and the 
c.otit iiiued esistence of the world." 
1.2 Conflict Resolution Methodologies 
Forma1 modeling approaches are required to study the wide variety of conflict sit- 
r~ations that can arise in the real world. An important role for mathematics is to 
provicie sptematic structures Mt hin which arguments can be frarned and followed 
to their conclusion [i']. It is then easier to ensure that assumptions are clearly 
st at ed, to examine the resulting models rigorously, and to explore the consequences 
of different hypotheses. Non-Cooperative Game Theory [87], mas the first method- 
ology t hat aimed to analyze choices, and explain outcomes, in strategic conflicts. 
HistorïcaUy, the idea of game models in term of players, strategies, and outcomes 
wns a gea t  contribution to the modeluig of conflict. A "game" is simply a model 
of a situation with a certain structure of relevant participants ("players"), each 
nith various courses of action available ("moves", making up "strategies"), and 
r i th preferences over the possible outcornes [7]. The focus on decision makers 
( DUS) and their possible courses of action is sometimes characterized as a "rational 
actor" approach, though "rationality" may sometimes be defined very broadly [7]. 
Ilarq- game-theoretic techniques have not been designed specifically to reflect what 
liiippens in the real world, but rather to be mathematically tractable. Classical 
garne theon: as presented by Von Xeurnann and Morgenstern [87] and Nash (691 
is oftcn a difficult and inconvenient way to model many situations that could arise 
iii practice. Often t here is insufficient information available for calibrating a game- 
t lieoretic model. For many actual problems, there is usually little or no quantitative 
iiifor~natiou, and probabilities are often subjective and "intrinsically unmeasurable" 
[13]. In practice, one of the most difficult aspects of assessing a conflict is sirnply 
orgariizing the available non-quantitative information. Moreover, to mode1 a nider 
\-;iriet,y of the strategic behavior that arises in complex conflicts in the real tvorld. 
t lie concept of rationality needs to be refined. The need for eq-to-apply tools 
iipplicable to cornplex conflicts and the desire to model a nider vaxiety of strategic 
Iwli;ivior, have stimulated the emergence of mhat this thesis refers to as conflict 
rwolution methodologies - a group of methodologies that are distinct from the 
more traditional approaches of game theory. 
ConAict resolution methodologies take into account the possible reactions of a 
particular DM to the other DMs' knom strategies. Moreover, they are absolutely 
ordinal, mhich makes codict  models easier to specify and avoids utilities, mixed 
sirategies, and other aspects of game theory that can be difncdt to apply and to 
communicate [SOI. These methodologies have two major hinctions. First , mhen 
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il conflict is modeled, the available information pertaining to the dispute is put 
iiito proper perspective and the problem is systernaticaliy stmctured. Second, the 
conflict mode1 is analyzed to predict possible solutions to the dispute. Based on the 
resiilts of a conflict study, a DM can select a redistic course of action that would 
be most beneficial for his or her purposes. Among this group of methodologies 
ilrr Howard's Metagame AnalysU [41], Fraser and Hipel's Conflict AnalysW [23, 
261. Brarns' Theorg of Moves [13] and Fang, Hipel and Kilgour's Graph Modet for 
Co@ict Resolution [19,20, 561. As Kilgour has pointed out [50], "What al1 of these 
vii<leavors have in cornmon is game- t heoret ic roots-al1 are essent ially game t heory 
fiiriiitits tliat have been designed to yield better decision advice or more compelling 
st ritctural insights." 
1.2.1 Metagame Analyszs 
Historically. a fresh approach to conflict resolution began Nith Homard's pioneering 
rlmelopnient of metagame analysis (411. Metagame anahsis introduces two stability 
roiicepts. general rnetamtionality and symmetric metamtionality, which take into 
ii<.~ûtint the possible moves and countemoves of the players. An outcome is general 
iiirtarat ional for a player if for every unilateral irnprovement (UI) amilable to t hat 
pliior, the opponent or opponents are able to respond such that the initial player 
rnds up at a l e s  preferred outcome, which suggests that it might be better for 
r h ~  initial player to remain with the original outcome. An outcome is qmmetric 
metarational for a player if for each of his or her UI(s), the opponent or opponents 
have responses by mhich they can guarantee that regardiess of the initial player's 
corint er-response, the resulting outcome is l e s  preferred by the initial player to the 
original one. 
Besides defining possible human behavior in conflict situations in an innova- 
tive fashion, Howard [41] provided a flexible notation, called tabular f o m ,  which 
formecl the basis for the option form, a convenient nray to structure and record 
tlie main elements of a conflict model. The equilibria resulting from symmetric 
metarationality and general metarationality are subject to credibility assessment. 
Metagame andysis does not include an algorithmic method of credibility determi- 
iiat ion; it is up to the analyst to distinguish whether or not predicted outcomes are 
I~asecl on credible sanctions. Howard [45] has recently used the metaphor of drama 
t O rstend metagame analysis to include an understanding of the role of irrationality 
ii i d  emot ions in strategic conflicts. 
1.2.2 Confict Analyszs 
Iiiiprovements and estensions to metagame anaiysis were provided by Fraser and 
H i p l  [23. 261. They developed a "conflict analysis" met hod by adapting traditional 
irii3t;igame analysis to the study of practical problems. Postulating that the cred- 
ihility of a sanction is related to the preferences of the players, they proposed a 
roti~niient metliod and a straightfonvard aigorithm for the analysis of a codict .  
The rien7 solution concepts of sequentzal stability and simdtaneous stability were 
tlius developed. Moreover, Fraser and Hipel [25, 241 recommended anaiyzing every 
oiitcome from every DM'S point of view for stability. 
Option form is an improved version of Howard's tabular form used in conflict 
analysis. Mrith s u c c e d  applications to real-world conflicts, including large-scale 
oues. many d u a b l e  techniques independent of the stability concept have been 
introduced under the framework of confiict analysis, including 
Outcome remaual, to eliminate infeasible outcomes. 
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The Prefesence tree [27] method, which ranks the states for a given DM based 
upon lexicographie preferences over the options. 
Coalition analysis [63] [66] [40] in conflicts with more than two DMs, which 
predicts the coalitions that are most likely to form by determining the overd1 
preferences of a possible coalition, in order to ascertain the strategic implica- 
t ions of coalition formation. 
Sensitititg analyses, to assess the relative validity of the results of a conflict 
arialysis even if the information being used is uncertain [26]. 
Hypergnrne anal~sis  to analyze conflicts in which there are misperceptions by 
one or more of the DbIs (6, 881. 
A rrc~nt cleveloprnent , related in spirit to other conflict resolution methodologies, is 
Brarns's Theory of .\loves [13]. In TOM (Theory of Moves), the basic equilibrium 
c-oiirept is nonmyopic equilibrium (NME), assuming that most real-life D31s are 
iiot so myopic- especially nhen they are making important decisions - as to con- 
sider only the immediate effects of an action, without taking into account possible 
responses of ot her players, as me11 as t hemselves. 
The Theory of Moves comprises several methods for analyzing formal rnodels 
that cliffer in several crucial ways from games, although they have much in common. 
Conflicts are seen as moving from state to state according to unilateral actions by 
t lie players-t he initial state matters, and the relative powers of the players may be 
tised to continue, or stop, the process. 
1 Introduction 
1.2.4 Graph Model for Conflict ResoIut2on 
The recently developed graph form of the conflict mode1 extends and refines many 
of these methodologies to describe more accurately the behavior of participants in 
ii strategic conflict [19, 20, 561. The graph form takes states, rather than individual 
tlecisions, as the basic units for describing a conflict. Possible types of social behav- 
ior iri a conflict are then represented by appropriate solution concepts. The graph 
irio(le1 for coo0ict resolution constitutes a significant reformulation and extension 
of otlier esisting approaches to the systernatic study of strategic conflicts. It has 
ilist inct advantages over the other systems, as it posseses a solid theoretical foun- 
dar ion. inherent flexibility, and a comprehensive approach to formally describing 
strategic behavior. The theoretical background of the Graph Model for Conflict 
Rrsolutiont and its advantages over other rnodeling approaches will be describeci in 
Cliapter 2. 
1.3 Existing Decision Support Systems for Con- 
flict Resolution 
Ac-iaording to Sage (791, "in very general terms, a decision support system (DSS) is a 
%*stem that supports t echnological and managerial decision making by assisting in 
the organizat ion of knowledge about ill-structured, semi-structureci issues". Deci- 
siou support systems (DSSs) have been developed for modeling decision situations 
involving more than one DM. Close to the context of this thesis are those designed 
for emplo-nennt in negotiations, which are also commonly referred to as negotia- 
tion support systems- Kîlgour et ai. [55], Thiessen and Loucks [85], and Jelassi 
i\u<l Foroughi [47] provide overviem and cornparisons of existing negotiation mg 
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port systems. Papers describing the theory and application of existing negotiation 
siipport systems include contributions by Angus [2], Anson and Jelassi [3], GauMn 
et d. [30], Jarke et al. [46], Nagel and Mills [67], Nunamaker [?O], Singh et al. [82], 
and Winter [89]. Radford et al. [75] provide an overview of DSSs more specific to 
the context of conflict resolution. 
Conflict resolution methodologies also require implementation aigorithms to fa- 
cilitate t heir use in practical applications. To permit convenient and expeditious 
i isr I)y pract itioners, a given met hodology and its associated algorit hms should be 
miiputerized. In t his rvay, the decision technique is transformed into a realizable 
cl~cision technology [75]. 
Software packages have b e n  carried out based on Howard's "metagame anal- 
+* (COSAX [44] and INTER4CT [9]), Fraser and Hipel's "conflict anaiysis" 
(Drc:ision.\laker [BI, SPANXS [65]) and other principles (DSA [64]). GMCR 1 was 
t t i ~  oiily one based on the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. It was developed 
I)y Fang, Hipel and Kilgour and is included on diskette with their book Interac- 
t w  Decision Making: The Graph Model for Conflzct Resolution [20]. Al1 of these 
soft~wre packages are intended to be utilized for aiding decision making under con- 
dit ions of sr rategic conflict , nhich is ill-structured in nature. Therefore, t hey a bide 
Ily. Lss or more. the "most generd terrns" of DSSs as mentioned in the beginning 
of tliis section. -4 description of these existing DSSs is given as follows. 
1.3.1 CONAN 
COSAS (cooperation-or-codict analysis) [42,43] is a DSS based on the metagame 
aualrsis of Howard [41]. In CONAN, the option form of metagame analpis is em- 
ployed to interactively mode1 and analyze conficts. Though the solution concepts 
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of  Gl IR and SàIR are used, CONAN does not go immediately to the final equi- 
librium results by exhaustive stability andysis. .mer first defining the DMs and 
options, the user is required to speci& a scenario for each analysis. Infeasible moves 
are specified by the user using "consequence judgement". CONAN keeps track of 
the preferences of each DM, and the user is required to provide a series of "judge- 
~nents" during the analysis process. This places a heavy load on user interaction 
ancl limits COXXN's ability to andyze large scde conflicts, though more flexibility 
mmlcl be one of its benefits. An off-line graph analysis named %trategic mapn, 
rlioiigli not implemented on cornputer, is suggested as an important component of 
C'OSAS 1421. 
CONAS r v a  developed in a DOS platform for IBM-compatible PCs. .A simple 
11liiiii test menu is provided as user interface. The keyboard is its only input device. 
Sot being very user-friendly, CONAN identifies its user as "a COXAN expert", 
working with a client tearn anaiyzing a problem. 
'\lare recentiy, the development of another two packages, 'Irnmerse Soap" and 
5TCDIO" [El were also announced by Nigel Howard Systems as pilot projects. 
Iiiinierse Soap n*as seen by the author more like a illustration package than a soft- 
ware package - no computing componenc is included. STUDIO nTas intended to 
l>e a Kindows based package that would incorporate CON.w, InterAct: and Deci- 
siou'ifaker (the latter two are described below), as well as also drama theory ideas 
[IS]. Honwer, no further information about these two projects is available. 
ISTER4CT is a DSS that can be used to mode1 and analyze confiicts [8, 91. The 
o~erall  objective of the system is to support a flexible modeling methodology. The 
iiiiclerlying decision making mode1 is metagame theory [41]. This DSS uses the 
optiou form and graphical displays to analyze situations under the control of several 
interested participants. INTERACT can perform dability analyses for feasible 
scenarios. 
ISTERXT is similar to CONAN in terms of their functions, but INTERACT 
lias a graphical user interface, and the "strategic map" has been graphically imple- 
iiiciited on-line. IYTERACT allows the user to display and work on any part of 
r lit. nioclel at any time, nith opportunities to add commentary on actions, options. 
srmarios, etc. ISTERKT enters preferences in two different ways: one is based 
iipoii the number of the options "desirable" or 'kndesirable" (specified by the user); 
rlir other is a purely manual movernent of individual scenarîos in the tableau. 
R.unning in a "Hypemindow" environment, INTERkCT shows the relevant 
i*leiiirnts of the model on the screen, together with the available commands. This 
;illows one to manipulate the model easily, rhile providing a constant visual guide 
ro what is happening. According to the authors [8], bISWindoms was considered as 
riie first alternathe platform for IKTERACT. It was only because " H ~ y e ~ i n d o n ~ s "  
 vas iin ongoing project of their colleagues - r h o  were d l i n g  to provide the full 
source code - that  they changed their minds. 
ISTERACT uses graphical notation to represent "linked issuey or Bennett's 
Prtbliminary Problem S tructue (PPS) ,trying to show some recognition of hyper- 
game analysis. But such problem structuring is not incorporated into formal anal- 
yses. rhich stiil takes account of one issue at a tirne. 
DrcisionNaker: The Confüct .halysis Program [29] is a DSS that permits a user to 
immediately carry out extensive conflict studies. More specincally, it employs the 
option form and solution concepts of sequential stability for modeling, analyzing 
and interpreting both small and large conflicts. DecisionMaker handes the removal 
OF logically or preferentially infeasible states for one DM (Type 1 and Type 2 as 
defined in Cliapter 2 of [26]), where the involved options are under the control 
of ii single DM. For a Qven DM, relative preference can be entered using simple 
pr~ference statements about the options. .4ssuming transitivity, an algorithm in 
tlio DSS converts the preference statements to a preference ordering of the states. 
The specifically designed algorithm and data structure based on the preference 
trrr technique allow Decisionililaker to handle a large nurnber of states efficiently 
Hotwmr, the trade off for using this special data structure includes, feasible states 
miinot be esplicitly listed; state ranking can not be s h o m  which makes the pref- 
cbrriic:e specification a blackbox to the user; and some unnecessa- restrictions have 
to Iw applied to the option statements used for state removal and preference tree 
~ i i s t  ruction; etc. Decisionhiaker produces sequential stability results t hat may 
provide giidance for DMs. A simple status quo analysis is implemented as out- 
piit iiiterpretation. Another interpretation is finding common options for al1 the 
~lquilibria. lIisperception is allowed as a partial 
i i i ~ t  liod [88]. 
DecisionMaker is written in the C language 
implementation of the hypergame 
for use under the Microsoft Win- 
c l o ~ ~ ~ s  operating system on IBM-compatible microcornputers. It has a graphical user 
interface and is considered to be one of the most successfuUy designed applications 
of DSSs for cod ic t  management. 
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1.3.4 SPANNS 
SPASXS is a proposed DSS for strategic and tactical negotiation support [65]. 
Besicles a rule based system for the tactical component, the strategic support part is 
l~ased on a conflict analysis mode1 that is planned as an extension of DecisionMaker. 
Some new features, like hypergame analysis, option-based coalition formalization, 
iiiid a dynamic factor by a virtual "environment player", were proposed to be 
integated into the system. This system was claimed to be under development a 
fcw yars  ago [65], but no operational version is currently available. 
1.3.5 DSA 
DSA (Decision Systems Analysis) is a DSS that allows the modeling and solving of 
ii ritlige of games (conflicts of interest) [64]. The underlying methodolo~ is basecl 
011 a kind of oriented graph ("digraph") instead of trees. Games played on digaph 
Iiiire the flesibility to include cycles that allow the modeling of delaying tactics. 
Siiicr this DSS uses cardinal payoffs and deals Nith sophisticated repeated and 
sr orliastic games. it might seem to be of Little interest here. Nonetheless, it deals 
wirh tlic approach of "Theor). of 310vesn on 2 x 2 games, and orthogonal drawing of 
directed graphs shotving analyses of small size conflicts. DSA is currently intended 
for research purposes only, and is restricted to mal1 games (2 x 2 and 2 x 3). 
DSA is implemented on an MSDOS platform with the keyboard as its sole 
input device. The author claimed that he tws trying to make the next release of 
DSA available in a MSWindoms environment (641. 
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1.3.6 G M C R I  
GMCR 1 \vas developed by Fang, Hipel and Kilgour and included with the text- 
l~ook Interactive Decisaon Muking: Gmph Model for Confiet Resolution [20]. The 
iiiiiilysis component of the Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution has been nrell im- 
plcmented in a pon.emil engine written in C language. -4s the first DSS based on 
tlie graph model, this DSS reflects major recent achievements in the field of conflict 
riimagement and can take advantage of the strength of the graph model (refer to 
Swtion 2.4). One of the attractive features of GMCR 1 is its ability to provide 
stiildity resiilts for a wide range of solution concepts (refer to Table 2.1). It has 
I ) r w i  sticcessfully used to analyze a variety of real-world conflicts. 
G ' \KR I emphasizes analysis, and does not support user-system interaction. It 
rcqiiircs an ASCII input file containing an available model in a required format? and 
procltices a plain-test output file that can be printed out to show stability results 
of t!acli state for each DI1 under a variety of solution concepts. It is basicaily an 
niiiilysis program rithout a modeling component and an interactive interpretation 
fi~cility The maximum number of States in a model that GMCR 1 can analyze is 
200 for t1r-o-player conflict models, and only 100 for multi-player rnodels. 
The following conclusions are drawn fiom the above reviem: 
DSSs have been at least par t idy  developed for almost all of the conficict rem- 
lution methodologies introduced in Section 1.2. The desirability for software 
tools and decision support systems in this area is obvious. 
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Most of the systems with a modeling cornponent use option form, which means 
option form is well received by this community. Except for the preference tree, 
no systematic approach for preference elicitation has been presented. More 
flexible modeling techniques are to be developed. 
Although the listed packages fit into the most general framework of DSS based 
on ahat  they are intended or claimed to be capable of achieving, most of them 
do not hase comprehensive features for supporting decision making, especially 
in identifjing and implementing preferred alternatives. DecisionhIaker seems 
to be the only operational exception. Still there is a need for improvement 
on the interpretation side. 
Compreheosiw systems should be developed such that different techniques 
and rationality concepts can be integrated into al1 the stages of modeling, 
analysis and interpretation. 
Some of the DSSs (e.g. CON-UJ and INTERACT) treat analysis and interpre- 
tation as the same procedure and have encountered difficulty in dealing with 
large scale real-world conflicts. The pursuit for performance in analysis in 
DecisionlIaker bnngs unnecessary restrictions on the modeling. A loose cou- 
pling among the components of modeling, analysis and interpretation should 
lw promoted. 
A user-friendly graphical interface is greatly needed to d o w  non-sophisticated 
users to utilize the system. 
A11 the existing and operational systems are PGbased, which is probably 
because the users of DSSs for conflict resolution are so heterogeneous in their 
domains of applications that no platform other than a PC is readily common 
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accessible. 
Esisting systems, except DecisionMaker, have limitations in handling 
con flict models, 
GlICR 1 is the only .stem which implements a wide variety of solution con- 
cepts, but also the only .stem that does not have interactive modeling and 
interpretation facilities. A real interactive system is needed to enable prac- 
t itioners to actually appreciate its analysis ponter and the inherent flexibility 
of its underlying methodology. 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
Bo(-iiiise st rategic is so prevalent Nithin and among organizations bot h nat ionally 
; i i d  iiiternationally, the demand for decision support systems to assist decision 
i i i i ik~rs faced nith interactive decision problems is increasing. 
The objective of this thesis is to provide the next generation of a comprehensive 
(l~cision support system GMCR II, for systernatically studying strategic conflicts. 
Ii;isrcl on the Graph for Conftict Resolution paradigm. It is intended to 
rxploit the inherent adtantages of its underlying graph mode1 to a great degree, and 
to constitute a significant improvement over existing DSSs for conflict resolution, 
iii almost all aspects of st rategic conflict formulation, analysis and interpretation, 
and lience become an important tool to assist decision makers or decision analysts 
in the management of strategic uncertainty. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In the next chapter, the Graph 
Iloclei for Conflict Resolution, the underlying methodology of GMCR II, is outlined 
mat hemat ically. O t her conflict representation models are also introduced, and the 
aclmntages of graph mode1 over other models are explained. 
The third chapter gives an overview of the decision support system GMCR II 
aiid its development. Subsequently, the design and implementation of this DSS 
iire presented according to its t hree major components: Formulation (Chapten 
4). Arialysis (Chapter 5), and Output Presentation and Interpretatzon (Chapten 
6 ) .  Related theoretical developments and discussions, which help to make the 
systpm more effective in supporting real-world interactive decision making, are also 
iii(h1nl within appropriate contexts in these three chapters. 
The last chapter surnmarizes the original contributions of this thesis, and sug- 
grsts directions for future research and development. 
Chapter 2 
Graph Mode1 for Conflict 
Resolut ion 
Tlie Graph MoLl  for Confict Resolution is a comprehensive procedure for YS- 
t~matically studying real-world disputes [20]. X graph model describes the main 
rliiiracteristics of a strategic conflict in terms of the follonring key components: 
(lc~.ision makers, states, state transitions, and preferences. After developing the 
grapli model, one can use it as a basic structure to extensively analyze the possible 
strategic interactions among the Dhls, in order to identi& the possible compromise 
resolutions or equiiibria. A broad range of stabüity definitions has been defined 
sithin the graph model paradigm, dowing it to represent diverse human decision 
ma king charact eristics, and hence become a truiy comprehensive approach t O inter- 
attire decision making. The output from the stability analysis, as weii as related 
seiisitivity analyses can be used, for example, to support decisions made by specific 
DUS. 
The nest Mo sections outline some of the key ideas behind modeling and stabil- 
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ity analysis, respectively, in the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution 
[?O). Subsequently, an illustrative case is presented. Finally, the graph model is 
compared with other types of conflict models. 
2.1 Modeling 
The Graph Ilode1 for Conflict Resolution represents a conflict as moving from state 
to state (the vertices of a graph) via transitions (the arcs of the graph) controlled 
I)y the D'rIs. .A graph rnodel for a conflict consists of a directed graph and a payoff 
hmction for each DM taking part in the dispute. Let N = (1,2, ..., n) denote the 
set of DSIs and U = (ul ,u*, ..., up) the set of states or possible scenarios of the 
corifiict. .A collection of finite directed gmphs {D i  = (U, Ai), i E N), can be used 
t o iiiodel the course of the conflict. The vertices of each graph are the possible 
st ;WS of the conflict and therefore the vertex set, U, is common to al1 graphs. 
If DM i can unilaterally move (in one step) from state u to state u', there is an 
iiïc witli orientation from u to u' in Ai. For each DM i E N, a payoflfunction 
Pt : U + R, where R is the set of red numbers, is defined on the set of states. 
.\ pqoff  function measures the nvorth of states to a DM. It is assumed that ~aiues 
of tiie payoff function represent only the DM'S ordinal rankings of the states, as 
clescribed in more detail belon*. 
D31 2's graph can be represented by i's reachabzlity matriz, &, which displays 
rlie ilnilateral moves a d a b l e  to DM i kom each state. For i E N, R, is the p x p 
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iiiat ris defined by 
[ 1 if DM i can move (in one step) 
from state u  to state u' 
R . ( ~ . u r l  = { 
where u # t r ' ,  and by convention 
-4 more economicai expression of DM 2's decision possibilities is his or her reachable 
[kt. For i E N. DM i's reachable list for state u E U is the set S,(U) of a11 states 
ru ivliicii DM i can move (in one step) from state u. Therefore, 
Tlie payoff function for DM i, Pi, mesures how preferred a state is for i. Thus: if 
r i .  tr' E U. then Pi(u) 2 Pi(ur) iff i prefers u to u', or is indifferent between u and ut. 
Klic~n this inequality is strict for al1 pairs of distinct states for every DM, the confiict 
is called strict ordinal. Beyond the ordinal information of preference or inciifference, 
tiorliing can be inferred from the value of Pi. For instance, Pi(u) > Pi(d)  indicates 
t lia t i prefers a to u', but the value of Pi (u) - Pi (ut) gives no meaningful information 
ahoiit the strength of this preference. For convenience, positive integers are used 
as the values of Pi(*). 
.-\ unilateral improvement from a particuiar state for a specific DM is any pre- 
lerred state to rhich the DM can unilaterdy move. To represent unilateral zm- 
pmuernents (UMs), each DM'S reachabîiity matrix can be used to define a matrix 
R+. xccording to 
1 if &(u,u') = 1 and Pi(ul) > P,(u) 
O othernrise 
Siriiilarly, DM 2's reachable list, Si(u) ,  can be replaced by Sr(u) ,  defined by 
Tliiis. S c ( i l )  is calleci the unilateral impmvement list of DM i from state k. 
2.2 S t ability Analysis 
Tlic- stability analysis of a confiict is carried out by determining the stability of 
r w l i  state for every DM. A state is stable for a DM iff that DM has no incentive 
ro rlwiate from it unilaterally? under a particular behavior model, usually referred 
r ci as a st al~ility definition or solution concept. A çtate is an eqvilibrium or possible 
r(~so11ition under a particular solution concept iff al1 DLIs find it stable under that 
~t ;~l>ility definition. 
2.2.1 Oveniiew of Solution Concepts 
Iii stability analysis, if a DbI is able to move away from the state being examined, 
then what is required is a precise mathematical description of how the value of such a 
(lepartue is to be measured. A stability type or solution concept is such a description 
aucl is therefore a sociological model of behavior in a strategic codict .  h varie@ 
of solution concepts needs to be defined to allow many possible patterns of confiict 
Table 2.1: Solution Concepts and Hurnan Behavior 
1 Solution Concepts 
Pl] By opponent(s) Own 1 Medium 1 
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Sali stability (R) ' 
Cherai 







risk; satisfices A Scquentid stabiiity ,- (SEQ) Limited-move stability 




st rategizes II 
I )oliii\.ior ro be modeled. in order to reflect a \vide variety of strategic decision styles. 
t'rom cautious and consenative to prognosticative and manipulatitre. In t heir book. 
Fang et al. [20. Ch.31 define and rnathematically compare [20, Ch.51, the graph 
iiiodel solution concepts listed in Table 2.1. .Additionally, they demonstrate how 
grapii models can be equivalentiy expressed using eztenszve game.s, which are much 
more complicated and hence not as well suited for practicai applications [?O. Ch. 
41. hirt do connect the g a p h  mode1 to classical game theory. 
The solution concepts provided in Table 2.1 are developed for application to 
tanflicts with two or more than two DMs. The first two columns give the narnes 
of the solution concepts, their associated acronyms, and the corresponding original 
references. The last four columns hirnish characterizations of the solution concepts 
iii ii qualitative sense, according to the four criteria of foresight, disimprovements, 
knon-ledge of preferences and strategic risk. Foresight refers to the extent of a DM'S 
rbility to think about possible moves that could take place in the future. If the DM 
bas high or long foresight, he or she can imagine many moves and countermoves 
into the future when evaluating the consequences of an initial move on his or her 
part Sotice, for instance, that in Nash stability foresight is low, whereas it is very 
Iiigli for non-rnyopic stability. 
The disimprovements criterion in the third column refers to a DM'S Mllingness 
to move to a worse state. A (temporary) move to a l e s  preferred state, in order 
to reach a more preferred state eventually, is a strategic disimprovement. Disim- 
pro~ements by opponents are moves by the other DMs to put themselves in worse 
positions in order to block unilateral irnprovements by the given DM. 
Tlie knowledge of preferences column refers to the preference information used 
i i i  ;i stability analysis. For example, in a stability analysis under R, GMR or SlIR. 
tlie preferences of other DMs are not used, although their abilities to move to other 
states are taken into account. These solution concepts can be quite useful in sit- 
uations rhere a decision maker is uncertain about the preferences of his or her 
cmmpetitors. .As pointed out in the strategic risk column in Table 1, a DM who fol- 
lo\vs GlIR or SSIR is risk averse and consemative, and hence avoids strategic risk. 
Wien a DM follows Nash stability and a state is stable for him or her, he or she 
lias 110 available unilateral improvements and hence ignores strategic risk. Because 
tlir SEQ solution concept has medium foresight, it allows no disimprovements for 
bt nitegic purposes; preferences of al1 the decision makers involved are taken into 
ii<-coiint in the stablity calculations. A DM who thinks according to SE& accepts 
snme strategic risk in searching for "satisfichg" [81] solutions, since he or she as- 
sumes that any improvement may be selected - decision makers do not necessary 
iicheive the greatest possible improvement . Since Iimited move and non-myopic 
st a bilities permit strategic disimprovements that wil l  ult imately allow a DM to end 
iip at a more favorable state, these stability types include strategic risk. Under 
limited move stability, the horizon, h, refers to the length of the sequence of rnoves 
t bat a DM can envision beginning at the state being studied for stability. In fact 
L I  is equivalent to R and non-myopie stability (NM) is the limit of Lh stability 
nhen h approaches infmity. 
For il conflict involving more than two DMs, it is useful to define movements in- 
volvirig more than one DM. Let H C N be any non-empty subset of the Dhls, and 
Ict SH(u) clenote the set of ail states that can result from any sequence of unilateral 
iiiows. by some or al1 of the DMs in H, starting at state u. In this sequence, the 
saine DAI may move more than once, but not twice consecutively. If ut E SH(u) ,  
1t.t RHu(~ul) c enote the set of dl Iast players in legal sequences from u to u'. 
Definition 2.1 Let u E U and H N, H # 0. A unilateral move by H fiom 
I I  i s  cr rnember ofSA(u) Ç U, defined inductively by  
2. if IL' E SH(u) ,  j E H ,  and u" E Sj(ul) ,  then 
(a) if InH,(ut)l = 1 and j QH,(uf) ,  then u' E SH(u) and j E fZH,(uft), 
( h )  2j IRHU(u') 1 > 1 ,  then u" E SH(u) and j E C2H,(u"). 
If a DM'S graph is transitive, then for any two consecutive moves be the DM, 
there is ahays an equivalent single move available. We have 
Definition 2.2 Let u E U and H C N ,  H # 0. If al1 DMs' graphs are transitive, 
r i  milateral move by H fsom k is a member of SH(u) C U, defined inductively by 
I .  if j E H and ut E Sj(u),  then U' E Sa(u), 
2. i/ *ut E SH(u), j E H, and U" E Sj(ut), then ut' E SH(u). 
By replacing SH ( u )  , Sj (a) ,  and S (u') by S& (u) , Sr (u) , and Sj+ (ut), respectively, 
i ti t lie above definitions, one obtains the definition of a unzlate~al zmpmvement (UI) 
II>- H when al1 DMs' graphs are non-transitive or transitive. Refer to 120, Section 
3.41 for detailed definitions. 
SH(u)  and S&(u) can be thought of as H's reachable list and unilateral im- 
prowment k t .  respectively. In particuiar, the sets SN-i (u) and (u) represent 
tlic possible states of 'iesponse sequences" of i's opponents against a move by i to 
II. 
2.2.3 lllustrat2ve Definittons of Solution Concepts 
To pro~ide an appreciation of how the graph mode1 can represent the possible 
strategic interactions among DM5 in a strategic conflict, the definitions of the first 
four solution concepts listed in the left column of Table 2.1 are given nest. 
Nash Stability: Let i E N .  A state u E U is Nash Stable (R) for DM i ifl 
ST(!i) = 0. 
Cncler Yash stability, DM i expects that the other DMs will stay at any state i 
mows to, and consequently that any state that i moves to will be the final state. 
The initial state u is therefore stable 8 i cannot move from u to any state i prefers. 
General Metarationality: For i E N ,  a state u E U is generd metarational 
(GIbIR) for DM i z f f  for eveîy u' E Sf (u) there is at le& one state u, E SN-,(ut) 
With Pi (,u,) 5 Pi (u) .
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Cncler general metarationality, DM i i p e c t s  that the other DMs (N - i) will 
respond to hurt i, if it is possible for them to do so, in any sequence of unilateral 
mores. DM i anticipates that the conflict will end after N - i has responded. 
.4dclitionalIy, DM i's opponents are assumed to ignore their own payoffs mhen 
making t heir sanctioning moves. 
Symmetric Metarationality: For i E N, a state u E U zs symmetric meta- 
rational (SMR) jor DM i iff /or al2 u' E Sf (u ) ,  there &ts u, E SN-i(~') l  such 
khot Pi(rr,,) 5 Pi(u) and Pi (suy) 5 Pi(u) for a22 u,, E Si(uZ)- 
Tliv SlIR solution concept postdates that DM i expects that he or she will have a 
diiili<:e r O counterrespond (u,) to the other D bfs' response (u,) to i's original move 
( I I ' ) .  DN i ant icipates t hat the confiict will end after this counterresponse. 
Sequential Stability: Far i E N ,  a state u E U is sequentially stable (SEQ) 
for D M  i z f l for  every u' E Sr (u )  there is at least one state u, E SNei(u') with 
P,(k-) s P,(U). 
T l i ~  clifference between the GMR and SEQ is the requirement of SEQ that any 
saiiction be credible, in the sense that it is a unilateral improvement (or a sequence 
of iinilateral irnprovements) for the sanctioning DMs. 
Iii the Graph Model of Conflict Resolution, the last two solution concepts Iisted 
iu Table 2.1, Lirnited-move Stability and Nonmyopic Statbility, are defined 
iising the method of anticipation introduced by Kilgour [491. It is assumed that a 
rii t ional player 'mill choose the alternative which yields the preferred anticipated 
state." In limited-move stability of horizon h, DMs are supposed to be able to 
foresee a sequence of (maximum possible) length h. Xonmyopic stabiiity endows 
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t lie DlIs nrith sufficient foresight to envision the outcornes of arbitrarily long move- 
cotintermove sequences. Detailed definitions for theses two solution concepts and 
illiistrative examples for al1 the above solution concepts can be found in [20, Ch. 
2.3 Illustrative Case Study 
Tlir Graph llodel for Conflict Resolution is non* illustrated using a mode1 of a 
sr rat egic conflict that arose after the discovery of environmental contamination in 
Elniira. Ontario, Canada. The background of this conflict will nonr be outlined, and 
iiiialyses based on the graph model will be described. This conflict was previously 
stiidied by Kilgour et al. [54]. For additional details about the conflict and the 
I~iise rnoclel, and for references to original sources, see [32]. This case d l  be used 
t o  illustrate the design and implementation of GMCR II in the later chapters. By 
so doing, the emphasis is to demonstrate how rnodeling and analysis are conducted 
i i i  t lie decisi011 support system, rather than to make any strong clairns for this 
part icular rnodel. 
Elmira. a t o m  of about 7,500 residents, is located in an agricultural region of 
soiit liwestem Ontario, roughly equally distant (averaging 75 km) from t hree of the 
Grmt Lakes. Municipal water supply is drawn from an underground aquifer. In late 
1989. the Ontario Ministry of the Environment [MoE] discovered that the aquiter 
11-as contaminated by a carcinogen, N-nîtroso demethylamine (NDM-4). Suspicion 
fell on the Elmira pesticide and rubber products plant of Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. 
[Uniroyd, which had a history of environmental problems, and mas associated 
11-it h SD&L4-producing processes. 
lloE issued a Control Order under the Environmental Protection Act of Ontarào, 
wqiiiring t hat Uniroyal implement a long term collection and t reatment system, 
iiiitlertake studies to assess the need for a cleanup, and carry out any necessary 
c:lrrnup under Ministry supervision. Uniroyal immediately exercised its right to 
i i p p d .  Meanwhile, various interest groups formed and attempted to influence 
tlir process through lobbying and other means. Of particuiar note was the role 
of rlie Regional hlunicipality of Waterloo and the Township of Woolwich [Local 
Government], nhich took common positions in the dispute and, encouraged by 
t tir 'ifinistry. hired independent consultants and obtained extensive legal advice at 
sii1)stantial cost. 
S~gotiations involving MoE, Uniroyal, and Local Government began in mid- 
1091. SloE's objective ripas to cany out its mandate as efficiently as possible: 
Ciiiroyal wanted the Control Order modified or rescinded; Local Government wanted 
to protect its citizens and its industrial base. 
;\ grnpli model for these negotiations and the underlying conflict is shown in 
Figiircs 2.1 (a), (b), and (c). Figure 2.1 (d) provides an integated graph for al1 the 
t lirw DMs. 
To assign meaningful definitions to the states merely represented by numbered 
iiocles in the above graph model (Figure 2.1), an option form of this conflict is used. 
Esplanations aud discussions about option form WU be given in next section. The 
tliree DUS and their possible choices are shown in Table 2.2, and the definitions 
of the nine feasible states appear in Table 2.3. Note that if Uniroyal abandons its 
Elmira plant: 3ioE's and Local Government's choices are irrelevant. 
The reachable lists and preferences for each DM (&O c d e d  the "analytical 
r-epresentation" of the graph model, as opposed to the "graphicd representatzon" 
in Figure 2.1) are given in Table 2.5. In mid-1991, the Status Quo was state 1, a 
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(a) Pi =(4 3 8 7 5 2 9 6 1) (b) p2=(9 2 4 8 6 1 3 7 5) 
Figure 2.1: Elmira Conflict Mode1 in Graph Form: (a) DM 1 (MoE); (b) DM 2 
(Vniroyai); (c) DM 3 (Local Goverxunent); (d) Integrated Graph for the 3 DMs 
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Table 2.2: DMs and Options of the Elmira Conffict Model 
DMs and Options Interpretation 
1. MoE Ontario Ministry of Environment 
(1) llodify Modify the Control Order to make 
it more acceptable to Uniroyal 
2. Uniroyal Urziro yal Chernical Limited 
(2) Delay Lengt hen the appeal process 
(3) Accept Accept the current Control Order 
(4) Abandon Abandon Elrnira operation 
3. Local Government Regional llunicipality of Waterloo 
and Township of JVoolmich 
(3) Insist Insist that the onginaï Control 
Order should be applied 
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Table 2.3: Feasible States of the Elmira Conflict Model 
1. MoE 
(1) Modify Y N Y N Y N Y -  
2. uniroyal 
(2) Delay Y Y N N Y Y N X -  
(3) Accept N N Y Y N Y Y -  
(4) Abandon N N N N N N N N Y  
3. Local Government 
(5) I ~ i s t  N N N N Y Y Y Y -  
State Xumber 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Tabie 2.4: Preference Ranking for the Elmira Confiict Model 




7 3 4 8 5 1 2 6 9  
1 4 8 5 9 3 7 2 6  
7 3 5 1 8 6 4 2  9 
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I~argaining impasse with Local Government supporting Uniroyal. 














The analysis of the conflict using Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution finds the 
~qiiilibria shown in Table 2.6. States 1 and 4 are weak equilibria. and the conflict 
is iinlikely to remain at either for long. The stronger, longer term equilibria occur 
;kt state 5. state 8 and state 9. 
Historically, Local Govemrnent shifted quickly to support the original Control 
Order, resulting in state 5 for a protractecl interval of tirne. Then MoE and Uniroyal 
rlramatically agreed on a modified version of the original Control Order, thus mov- 
ing to the equilibrium at state 8. This agreement caught Local Government by 
surprise; it  protested vigorously, but was forced to reach a separate arrangement 
w-ït h Cniroyal. Other relevant background of the Elmira Codict  wili be provided 
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Table 2.6: Equilibria of the Elmira Conflict Mode1 
S tate Equilibrium under 
i GMR, SMR 
4 GMR, SMR 
5 R, GMR, SMR, SEQ, LI - Llo, NM 
8 R? GMR, SMR, SEQ, Li - Llo, N M  
9 R, GMR, SMR, SEQ, LI - Lio,NM 
Assume that tue onip consider [imited moue stabàlitg up to level M. 
i i i  Srctions 5.2 and 5.4.1 when the coalition analysis and sensitivity analyses of this 
i.otifiict are cimied out. Even though GMCR II is capable to handle large or even 
liiige real-world conflict model, this Sstate conflict model is still chosen for as the 
main illust rat ive case throughout this t hesis. This is because this conflict mode1 is 
stiitiible to illustrate a wide range of design features in GMCR II. Another a d l ~ n -  
tiige is that information about a conflict model of this size is easier to be presented 
in sarne screen. 
2.4 Cornparison with Other Conflict Representa- 
tion Models 
Au t~bstract game model conceptualizes a strategic conflict using a formal mathe- 
uiatical structure. i\ny abstract model attempts to capture the key aspects of a 
c-onflict? there by making it easier to understand. A game or conflict model is thus 
an  approximation of reality that systematicdy structures what are considered to 
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t)e the most important components of the situation. The conflict model may rein- 
force the modelers understanding of the contlict. It  can also act as a "bookkeeping 
recliiiique" to help keep track of mhat is happening [20]. 
Following are a brief description of representations for strategic conflicts, other 
tliaii the graph model, that have been developed in the literature. 
Normal Form 
The nomal  f o m  of abstract game model was first defined by von Neumann and 
1Iorgrnstern [86] and is commonly used for describing a conflict in which there are 
oiiIy two players. The basic building blocks for the normal form are the strategies 
(rompiete plans of action) for each player, which combine to form states. For games 
ivitli two Dbls, the normal form is often written as a m a t h ,  the rows representing 
r l i t b  first player's strategies, and the columns the second player's strategies. Hence, 
i w h  ce11 in the matrii represents a state. The actual outcome at the state is not 
roiisidered important; the normal f o m  displays only preference information, in 
r l i v  form of Seumann-'rforgensteni utilities. The normal form is d s o  commonly 
rvf(wrc1 to as matrixform. For games with more than two DMs, the normal form 
i5 iiironwnient, even though theoretically it can be constructed by adding more 
sp;itial dimensions. 
Option Form 
The format for the codic t  model displayed in Table 2.3 is cailed the option 
/onn or sometimes the binary Jorn, and mas origindy proposed by Howard [41]. 
It is used estensively in Metagame Analysis [41] and Conflict Analysis [25, 261 for 
~ncoding a confiict model. A game in option form is simply a list of each player's 
options or available courses of action, dong mith a rule for specif'ying the payoffs 
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or preferences for each player over the states. To specify a state, the status of 
( w r y  option must be indicated. A "Y" placed beside an option means that the 
option is taken up by the player controllhg it, whereas an "N" indicates that the 
option is rejected. -4ny combination of Y's and N's opposite al1 the options of 
a given player represents a complete stmtegg for that player. After each player 
diooses a strategy, the result is a state or outcorne. .4 state thus appears as vector 
of Y's and N's; each component corresponds to an option in the conflict. \\'hile 
ws~iitially similar to normal form in terms of the kinds of information that can be 
rq~resented. an option fom can conveniently handle games with any finite nurnber 
o f  players. Moreover, the option form takes options as its basic building block, and 
t liiis is more compact than game models mhich take strategies (combinations of 
options) or states (combinations of strategies) as their basic building blocks. For 
t liiw rc+asons7 option brm is capable of representing more comples models in a 
(.i,iiil>iict and easily understandable fashion. 
Extensive Form 
The extensive form is another abstract game model, presented by von Xeumann 
ancl Slorgenstern [86] and refined by Kuhn .2]. In the extensive form. a tree 
striictiire is utilized to describe the players' order of choice, and the information 
wailable to each player at  each choice. Each node in the tree corresponds to an 
occasion at mhich one player must act. Each branch fiom the node represents a 
possible choice by the player. The extensive form is remarkably flexible, and can 
depict the flow or evolution of a game and the availability of information. 
While it is a powerful tool, the extensive form is not mell designecl for use in 
practical applications. The malyst must obtain far too much detailed informa- 
tion about the conflict in order to construct the extensive form for even modestly 
romples conflict. Another reason why the extensive form is cumbersome to em- 
play in practice is that it requires fixed timing and sequence information on how 
tlie game evolves, which may not be available in real-world large-scale interactions. 
Fiirthennore, many actual decision problems do not possess definite endpoints that 
~ s t  ensive form requires. 
111 siirnrnary, the gaph  and option forms of the abstract game mode1 work well 
For rnoclels of any size, whereas the normal fom is best suited only for models with 
t w )  DMs, and the extensive form can only be used with fairly simple models. 
U'liile more efficient than the extensive form, the graph form is also significantly 
niorr flexible than option form and normal form in its capability to model state 
transitions. It is believed that the information contained in an option or normal 
h ~ r m  model can be easily transferred into analytical representation of a graph model, 
I ) t i r  riot rice versa. Listed below are some situations for which special forms of state 
transition information are difficult, if not impossible, to express, or easily ignored, 
oscept in graph form. 
Irreversible moves: Sometimes a DM in a conflict model can cause a confiict to 
go fiom state u to a' by a unilateral move, but canaot make the transition back 
[rom q to k. Irreversible rnoves exist widely in the real world. In the graph 
form shown in Figure 2.1, many moves are irreversible, and thus represented 
by uni-directional arcs. For instance, UniroyaI cannot easiiy retum once it 
abandons its Elmira operation. 
Common moves: Sometimes two or more DMs can independently make unilat- 
eral moves that cause the model to change fiom a departure state to exactly 
the same destination state. Though not very "common", common moves do 
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esist in the red world, e.g. Fang et al. give an example of common moves in 
a simplified model of a superpower nuclear confrontation [20, Ch.21. 
Forcing moves: When a DM makes a certain move, one or more other DMs may 
have no choice but to make a forced response; thus the original DM achieves 
a new state 'iinilaterally" . The concept of forcing move was first identified in 
the proposa1 of this thesis. An example of a forcing move appears in a model 
in [35], where one DM (govemment) forces another DM (industry) to stop a 
project by denying the license. Though not identified by the authors. another 
esample can also be found in [33]. 
Intransitive Moves: Option form and normal form always assume the transi- 
tirity of moves: for any sequence of rnoves in which one DM moves twice 
consecutively. there is always an equivalent single move available. Some use- 
ful sequential information may be lost by using this assumption. The graph 
mode1 cioes not necessary take this assumption, and hence can be appiied to 
more general situations. 
The stability analysis for a conflict model utilizes only states, state transitions. 
;iiirl r lie Dl Is' preferences over the states. In other words, stability analysis takes 
placr iit the state level. Consequently, the graph forrn of conflict model, with states 
as its basic building blocks, is especiaily suitable for use at the stability analysis 
stage. However, despite its flexibility on state transitions mentioned above, the 
grapli form also has limitations. 
First, a state in graph form is identified only by number and displayed as a num- 
l>crecl node, which would seem meaningless to a practitioner. In [20], this problem 
is solved by employing option form to define the states. Secondly, even though it is 
mucli more efficient than extensive form, the graph form does require considerable 
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effort to construct a g a p h  mode1 by directly specifying the states, state transitions 
aiid preferences for a medium or large conflict model. The decision support system 
GNCR II presented in this thesis solves this problem by taking advantage of the 
ïiigh efficiency of the option brm in the modeling stage. The option form is uti- 
lized to automatically generate the information on feasible states, allowable state 
transitions, and relative preferences of each DM. This information actually foms  
t lie analpical representation of the graph fom,  which is then used at the analysis 
stage iinder the paradigm of the Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution. In this wax 
t lie option form does not replace, but rather enriches the graph model. Obviously, 
t o  sii(:cessfiilly fulfill its role in a decision support system, the option form needs to 
owrcoine the drawbacks pointed out above in state transitions representation. -4s 
wil1 lw seen later, one of the main contributions of this thesis is the improvement 
of  option form to enable it to capture key components of a conflict , including state 
transitions, and to do so in harmony with the graph model. In this thesis, up to 
C'1i;ipter 3? "option form" refers to the option form as described by Howard [41], 
iiiitl Fraser and Hipel [26], nhich mas popuiarly used before this research. Starting 
witli Chapter 4, h o m e r ,  this term refers to the "improvedn option form. 
Chapter 3 
Overview of the Decision Support 
System GMCR II 
3.1 Applicability Contexts for GMCR II 
Tlirre are many situations in which a DSS for codict resolution, such as GBICR 
11. can be useful. They inciude: 
1. A deczszon maker analyzes a strategic conpict in which he or she is a partic- 
ipant. 
2. A consultant advises a decision maker. 
In the above two cases, strategic interactions following the focal participant's 
actions can be analyzed, and the consequence of certain strategies estimated, 
in order to improve the participant's position. 
3. .4n ànterested third party analyzes a dispute in which he or she is not a decision 
maker. 
An analyst can utilize GMCR II by using various evolution of a conflict and to 
estirnate, Say, what the preferences must have been to produce the observed 
outcorne. The analyst can also study how the structure of the conflict inf'lu- 
enced behavior, thereby identifjhg better ways to structure a future confiict. 
4. A faczlitator uses a mediation tool to coordznate information among the actual 
decision makers, and assess possible compromises. 
-4 mediator can utilize GMCR II as communication and analysis tool to esti- 
mate possible outcomes by using various preference rankings, wit hout reveal- 
ing (or knowing) which one correctly describes the participants. This might 
iclentify options t hat are detrimental, irrelevant , or beneficial to al1 parties. 
An especially useful setting is a meeting of a subset of the actual decision mak- 
ers. Based on their common assumptions about others, the decision problem 
can be simulateci and potential agreement (collective improvement ) can be 
made among participants. 
ri. .4n analyst conducts simulation studies in which interested participants play 
the d e s  of decision makers inuolved in a confict. 
G. It /iris been dificult to study large x a k  u>n.icl problem t h e :  to the hck  O/ 
suitable cornputerized systems. The use of GMCR II as a research tool mil1 
f i I I  the gap. 
As can be seen ftom the above, an intended user of GMCR II: 
can corne from any discipline that deals with conflict; 
is not necessarily a sophisticated cornputer user; 
is not necessariiy a frequent user of the system; 
is not necessarily a professional conflict specialist, and therefore may have 
only basic lcnowledge of conflict resolution and the graph model. 
Noreover, decision environments of real-world confkts are usudly at most par- 
tially structured and hence only partly cornputable, so the user's judgement is a 
W. important part of the decision process. Therefore, user interaction and user 
cmitered design are of extreme importance for this DSS. As well, the system must 
Iw portable and require no unusual hardware and software support so as to be 
iic-cessible to a wide variety of intended users. 
The versatile decision environments and user profile decide that GAICR II has to 
l w  ; in ndaptiw systern [Ml, and continuoiis improvement to the system is clesirable. 
CXCR II is expected to effectively assist users in al1 phases of modeling, analysis. 
aiid interpretation of strategic conflicts. 
3.2 The GMCR II Framework 
Tlir stnictiire of GhICR II is depicted in Figure 3.1. The system comprises a 
iriodeling subsystem, an analysis engine, an output interpretation subsystem. The 
modeling subsystem receives user input via the user interface, processes the input 
and automatically generates an analytical graph model mhich can be accepted by 
t lie analysis engine. Modeling information, such as DMs and options, feasible state 
k t .  reachable lists and preference rankings c m  be also conveyed to the user inter- 
face. making the rnodeling itself a genuine interactive process. The analysis engine 
tlioroughly analyze the stability of every applicable mes on every state for every 
DII. Stability resdts are then stored in an efficient and easy-to-retrieve bit-mise 
structure mhich is then maintained by the output presentation and interpretation 
system. The output interpretation system coordinates the display of every aspect 
of the stability result based on the user's requests via the user interface. Requests 
for acIcIitiona1 analyses can also be directed to analysis engine; the relevant output 
is tlien presented to the user via the output interpretation subsystem. .A loose cou- 
pliiig. as a good software engineering practice, is maintained among the subsystems. 
Comparing the GMCR II structure with the typical DDM (dialog, data and 
iiiod~ling) paradigm of DSS as suggested by Sprague and Carlson [53] and Sage 
[;!.Il. it  seems that the DBMS (data base management system) [79]- which would 1)e 
tlir most iniportant part of a traditional DSS, is missing. The author believes that 
i r  is I~ecatise the special nature of the DSSs for conflict resolution including GNCR 
II. Tlic versatile decision environments, as outlined in last section, determine that 
CXCR II cannot be designed as a speczfic DSS [83, 791. The three technology 
I(w~1s of DSS? according to Sprague and Carlson [83], are "specific DSS", "DSS 
gc*ii(mtorg' and -DSS tools". GMCR II is a speciai form of DSS that can be best 
~lrsciihecl as one betiveen a DSS generator and a specific DSS. It does not have 
pirticular domain of application, and does not possesses a pre-existing data-base. 
Ir iq 0111~ when it is applied to a particular strategic conflict, and popularized nith 
tltr information obtained from the case, that it actually s e m  as a specific DSS. In 
tliat case, the original information and the rich amount of additional information 
rcsiilting from the extensive analyses, can be envisioned as a data-base, and the 
oiitpiit presentation and interpretation subsystem a management tool of the data. 
GNCR II has been developed in the Microsoft Windows environment, first in 16- 
I ~ i t  Windons, then in 32-bit \Vindom. BorIand C and Windoms API [72] were the 
initial development tools. The recent versions were designed using the ob ject-orient 
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Figure 3.1: GMCR II Structure 
tion Classes (MFC). The object-oriented design of GMCR II adopts the popular 
--1Ioclel-View-Controllef architecture, or MVC, which was initially developed by 
t lie SmallTalk developer community [go]. MVC suggests t hat a typical architecture 
will have three main components: a group of classes and objects that model the 
iiticlerl~-ing application itself; a group of classes or objects that provide a human- 
interface view of t hose model-related classes; and a group of ciasses and objects that 
i-otitrol, or synchronize, the behavior of othen. Reflecting the context of MFC, the 
programming model separates the data from the display of the data, and from most 
i ism interaction s i th  the data. GMCR II distinguishes two different types of user 
ititrrfaces. Dialog boxes are used for input that can change the model itself- Prop 
~ r t y  pages, which f o m  a property sheet occupying the client area of the document 
sixiclow~ are used strictlg for display; they cannot modify information about the 
iiioclel. The advantage of the separation of data, display, and data interface is ver- 
siitility in vien?ng the data. This feature is exactly what GMCR II: especially its 
otitpiit presentation and interpretation, needs. 
3.3 User Interface of GMCR II 
Figiir~ 3.2 shows the main €rame window of GMCR II. -4s can be seen, the view, 
or the client area of this CVindoms application, is occupied by a property sheet [73], 
wliich consists of eight different property pages. The fht page, upon the opening 
of a particdar document, dl guide the user through the relevant sequences of 
the operation of this system. The pages labeled "Decision Makers and Options", 
"Feasible States", "Aliowable Transitions", and "State Ranking" enable the user to 
riea the modeling information resulting fiom his or her own input specifications. 
This makes the modeling procedure interactive. The last three pages are applicable 
after the stability analysis of the model. They enable the user to view every aspect 
of the output information in a vaziety of helpful formats, from mhich desirable 
lollowup analysis c m  be requested to generate structural insights and decision 
aclvices about the conflict model. 
These property pages form the display part of the user interface. The use 
input in these pages only controls how or what aspects of the information is to be 
clisplayed; there is no way to alter the established conflict mode1 itself. The input 
information about the model is elicited through a series of dialog boxes that can 
I W  irimked ria the menu. Detailed features about the major input dialog box niil 
1 t~ (lrscribetl in relehant sections of the next three chapters. 
3.4 Modeling Subsystem of GMCR II 
Tlic modeling sub-system formulates the strategic confïict based on the user's input. 
III rlie current version of GhICR II, an improved option form is used to represent 
t lir ronflict model. An alternative graph-based modeling approach, is proposed at  
Cliapter 4 nith prelirninary design ideas. The rnodeling procedure of G'IICR II 
(msists of t hree major steps: 
0 the generation of feasible States, 
the calculation of aliowable state transitions, and 
the elicitation of preference Uiformation. 
The information gathered through this three steps f o m  the three major com- 
ponents of an "anaIytical graph modeln, which is used as the input to the analysis 
engine. 
Figure 3.2: The GMCR II Frame FVmdow 
3 Overview 
3.5 Analysis Engine of GMCR II 
The analysis engine performs a thorough stability analysis on the conflict model. 
The output is the stability result on every state, for every DM, under every solution 
concept as listed in Table 2.1. This large amount of data facilitates the user's various 
needs in the interpretation stage. 
Requests for various forms of foliow-up analyses usually arke when or after the 
user examines different aspects of the stability output. A wide range of possi- 
Ide follow-up analyses, including coalition analysis, status quo analysis, sensitivity 
aiialpis~ hypergarne analysis, and dynamic analysis, are discussed in Chapter 5. 
It is believed that in a DSS, the consideration of efficiency is usually secondary 
to effectiveness (791. This is an important guideline to the development of DSSs 
including GMCR II. However, due to the possible combinatorid complexity that 
coiild result from the option form representation, and the high frequency of user- 
system interactions (the effect of which can be affected by any perceivable delay), 
efficiency, in the case of GMCR II, is itself an important factor of effectiveness. 
Therefore, a considerable amount of effort was devoted to the improvement of 
efficiency for Mnous algorithms. 
3.6 Output PresentationandInterpretationSub- 
system of GMCR II 
Conflict resolution techniques can mainly be described as descriptive techniques 
in that they describes a Mnety of possible compromise resolutions (equilibria) as 
well as the mrious social interactions that can cause these equilibria to take place. 
GAI CR II is intended to be a prescriptive tool [79] that can also advice a decision 
maker how to optimize his choice of strategies in order to reach his or her most 
preferred equilibriurn within the social constraints of the conflict. The output 
presentation and interpretation subsystem is the major component that enables 
GIICR II to have normative [79] function. 
In the output presentation and interpretation subsystem, various aspects of the 
output data are presented to the user via careNly designed user-interface. The 
innovative output presentations gave the user the idea what optimal equilibrium 
woiilcl be. Vigorous follow-up analyses, especially the status quo andysis facility, 
provide significant assistance for the user to utilize his/her judgement to rule out 
iiifeasible predictions and work out strategic plan for the implementation of the 
cliosen objective. 
3.7 Validation and Testing of GMCR II 
An iteratiw design approach [83] mas adopted in the development of GMCR II. 
This approach is similar to "prototyping" in that many versions of the system were 
cl~w1opt.d~ but it differs in that each version, including the initial one, was real, live, 
;iiicl ilsablet not just a pilot test. Considerable effort w8s devoted to validation and 
test ing during t his iterative design and development process. The main components 
of this effort are outlined below. 
GMCR II riras employed to mode1 and analyze a range of real-world applica- 
tions, many of mhich are documented in a Mnety of publications, including 
- Elmira groundwater contamination dispute [22,58,57,61], which is used 
as the main illustrative case throughout this thesis; 
- Flathead river resource development confiict [35, 371; 
- Prijedor rehgee retuni conflict in Bosnia, including analysis of the im- 
plications of severai hypotheses about the objectives of one DM [60]; 
- Softrvood Iurnber dispute between Canada and U.S.A. (phases 1 [38] and 
11 [39]); 
- Garrison Diversion Unit dispute (36, 21, 711; 
- Cuban missile crisis [59]; 
- Trade-in-Setvice conflict [40]; 
In these applications, results were compared with preiious analyses wherever 
feasible. The results produced by GMCR II were always found to be correct. 
Functional and structural tests were conducteci on many abstract games, in- 
cluding some classical games for which well-verifieci stability results are avail- 
able, such as 
- Chicken (both original [76] and modified [20] versions); 
- Prisoner's Dilemma [77]; 
- Other 2 X 2 games (e.g. numbers 52 and 70) in Rapoport and Guyerts 
listing [76]. 
Various versions of GMCR II were used by students in at least 60 group 
projects for the course SD533 Conpiet Anaiysis, and for six undergraduate 
workshops, in the Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of 
Waterloo, during 1996-1998. The student feedback was very helpful, and 
contributed substantially to the features and usability of GMCR IL 
Demonstrations of GMCR II were provided to potential users including man- 
agement consultants, national defence and peace-keeping personnel, and con- 
flict resolution researchen and practitioners. These demonstrations were of- 
ten followed by valuable discussions, and sometimes problems for analysis 
were suggested by the audience. Evaluations were generally favorable and 
encouraging. 
To test the system's performance on large-scale models, GMCR II was applied 
to t lie largest documented conflict mode1 - the Trade-in-service Conflict [34]. 
This mode1 has six DMs, 20 options, and 184,320 feasible and distinguishable 
states. It nTas analyzed using DecisionMaker for the solution concepts Nash 
iitid SEQ only [34, 401. On a personal computer with Pentium II 266 mHz 
processor and 96 mb RAM, GMCR II took less than 30 seconds to generate 
the list of feasible and distinguishable states, about 10 minutes to calculate the 
preferences of al1 6 DbIs, and on the order of 70 minutes to obtain Sash and 
SEQ stability resuhs. GblCR II's results were identical to those calculated 
by DecisionMaker, and it is believed that GbICR II's speed and other aspects 
of its performance are superior. Consequently, there is everq- reason to believe 
tliat GMCR II's performance niIl be suitable for consulting, even when very 
large scale conflict models are required. 
Chapter 4 
Formulation of Strategic Conflicts 
The modeling stage is the problem-structuring phase of a conflict study. In many 
applications, significant insights are already gained at the modeling stage, before 
;in analysis is even executed. 
GNCR II employs the option form as the prirnary tool to input strategic conflict 
trioclels. The option t o m  is especiaily useN when the analyst can focus on the 
specific courses of action, or options, that are available to each DM. Because states 
arc represented as combinat ions of options, the number of states is exponentiailp 
iiirreasing in the number of options, making the option form very efficient, especially 
for large models. 
The andytical representation of a graph mode1 has four components, namely 
the Iist of DMs, the list of feasible states, allowable state transitions for each DM, 
and the ordinal preferences of each DM over the feasible states. In this chapter, 
the use of option form in GMCR II to specify the necessary information for the 
last three rnodeling components is shown. The option fom is fomally defined, and 
equipped mith efficient techniques to carry out appropriate tasks and operations. 
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Irnprovements are introduced to overcome drawbacks on state transitions outlined 
iii Section 2.4. Moreover, three approaches are designed for ordinal preference 
elicitation and representation. Since the modeling information gathered in option 
brm constitutes an analytical representation of a gaph  model and determines 
the state-based input to the stability analysis, the option-based formulation of 
conflict does not limit , but rather facilitates the application of the Graph Mode1 for 
Coiiflict Resolution to a strategic conflict. A graph-based model (in other words, 
;i tiioclel built directly upon a graphical representation), would also fully exploit 
tlic Aesibility of the graph model, and would be suitable for smaller models. But 
r l i i t .  to the lack of an appropriate graph-dranring development tool in the Windows 
platfornt no graph-based modeling has been implemented in the current version of 
GlICR II. Sonet heless, some design ideas for graph-based modeling are presented 
iii tlic lnst section of this chapter. 
4.1 Option Form 
Tlie set of decision rnakers in a strategic conflict can be denoted by 
11-liere n = IN1 > 2. Let the set of options of decision maker i E N be 
Then the set of al1 options in the conflict model is 
Here the index i indicates which decision maker controls an option. ünder some 
rirriimstances, this index can be suppressed, and the a d a b l e  option set can be 
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nliere m = Er='=, mi is the total number of options. A date u can be defined as a 
rriâpping 
u : O -t {O, 1) 
1 if DM i selects option O; 
O;. -t .(O$) = 
O othenvise 
Tlic?reforet the set of al1 rnathematically possible states in a conflict model is {O, 1)O. 
Sitire {O. 1)O is isomorphically equivalent to the power set 2O, every state u can 
dso be equivalently expressed as a subset of O, for which the mapping u is the 
rliaracteristic function. Obviously, the total number of mathematically possible 
stiit,cs is 2i01 = Zrn.  In practice, however, only a small portion of mathematically 
possible states ma' be feasible due to vanous possible option constraints. Section 
-4.3 esplains how GMCR II identifies and removes infeasible states. The set of al1 
jposible states is denoted as U 2 2O. 
Iii practice, each state can be represented by a Y-N column indicating which 
iivailable options are selected (denoted by Y for yes) or not taken (denoted by ?j 
for rio). For esample, Figure 4.1 shows the list of feasible states that GMCR II 
generated for the Elmira confiict model, descrîbed in Section 2.3. 
In Figure 4.1, each column of Ys and Ns represents a feasible state. Clearly, 
each column, except the right-most, corresponds to a particular mapping âom O 
to (0: 11, and is thus an equivalent representation of a state, as defined earlier. 
The right-most column stands for a single state that represents a group of fomdly 
clist inct but pract ically "indistinguishable" rnappings, and is discussed in detail in 
Section 4.3.3. 
Figure 4.1: Displaying Feasible States 
4.2 Implementation of Option Form in GMCR II 
The option form can present problems in memory and evecution time. For example, 
ISTERKT [8] (as mentioned in Section 1.3) has difficulty obtaining a list of al1 
Feasible scenarios, even in models Nith only 10 options. Fraser and Hipel [27] 
have devîsed algorithms and data structures for DecisionMaker based on a binary 
tree 5tructure that produces signXcant savings in memory and esecution t h e  in 
a stability analysis usiug the solution concept of SEQ, but the trade-off is that 
only one solution definition is applicable. Moreover, the list of feasible states and 
the preference rankings cannot be shown. In GMCR II, data structures and related 
algori t hms are carefully designed t O allow efficient execution of modeling operat ions. 
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4.2.1 Data Stmcture 
For each feasible state u E U, a unique integer b(u) can be defined as 
For example, let u be state 1 of the illustrative model shown in Figure 4.1, then we 
have 
b(u) = 0 - 2 ~ + 1 - 2 ~ + 0 - 2 * + 0 * 2 ~ + 0 ~ 2 ~  = 2  (decimal) 
If represented in binary format, 
32 bits 
A 
b(u) =: ..... O 001 0 (binary) v-v 
The brackets indicate which of the three DMs controls the option. Each bit in 
tlie applicable range equals 1 or O to indicate whether the option is selected by 
tlie decision maker controlling it, or rejected, respectively. GMCR II uses a 32-bit 
DO CBLEWORD to represent the specific option selection defining a state. Because 
there are 32 bits, this format can handle up to 32 options, which seems more 
t han sufficient for real-world applications. This straightforward data representation, 
combined nit h the bit-mise operation features of the C/CM language. constitutes 
a barns for a range of efficient algorithm in GMCR II. Detailed discussion of each 
dgorithms is located in the section to which it is most relevant. 
4.2.2 Pattern Matching 
Often a group of states with some common characteristics must be identified from 
the model. In GMCR II, "cornmon characteristics" refers to a partial specification 
of the options being taken or not taken, calied a "patternn. A pattern p can be 
4 Formulation 
defined as a mapping 
p :  O + {0,1,2) 
1 if decision maker i selects option oj  
O if decision maker i does not select option O; 
2 option o'j may or may not be selected 
In many operations in the modeling stage, it is important to determine whether 
a state "matchesn a particular pattern, or whether the state is one of the states 
spwified by that pattern. A state u is said to match a pattern p, denoted as u + p, 
i ff 
1) Vai E Oop(oi) = l =+ u(oJ = 1, and 
In practice, a pattern is most easily expressed in a binary format. For instance, 
.*...* 00 - - 1 (or NN - -Y when exposed to users) 
is a pattern representing those states in which option 1 is chosen and options 4 and 
-5 are not. In other mords, a pattern in binary format consists of 1's (Ys), 0's (Ns), 
and -S. The dash "-" indicates that the entry can be either a O(N) or 1(Y). States 
2 and 4 in Figure 4.1 match the above pattern. 
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A pattem cannot be directly recorded in a simple data stmcture. However, a 
pair of masb,  each of mhich is essentialb a DOUBLEWORD and thus very easy 
to store or manipulate, can be defined to equivalently represent a pattern in an 
est remely efficient manner. R e d  that 
For any pattern p, define 
as t tie zero-mask of p. and 
;is tlie one-mask of p. For example, for the above-mentioned pattern nith binary 
forniat 00 - -1, the two masks are 
As c m  be seen, mo (p) retains the O-bits of p with al1 other bits set to 1, while ml (p) 
retains the 1-bits of p with all other bits set to O. The pair of masks is "equivalent" 
to the pattern because 
Proposition 4.1 A state u matches pattern p: u C p, iff 
where " 1 " and & " are bit-wise OR and bit-wise AND, respectzvely. 
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Because of the C/C++'s capacity of bit-wise operation, the this pattern-matching 
test is very efficient. 
4.3 Scenario Generat ion and Reduct ion 
4.3.1 DMs and Options 
To formulate a conflict in option fom,  one must first identify the DAIS in the model 
iiii<l t lie options. or courses of action, that fdl  under the control of each one. Figure 
4.2 shows the GMCR II dialog box for entering DMs and options, where "Uniroyal 
Cliemicai Limited (Uniroyal)" under Decision Makers is highlighted; accordingl. 
the lower area contains Uniroyal's options. This dialog allows the user to input a 
full title and a short title for each DM, as well as a full description and a short 
description for each option. From this dialog box, a user can 
ndd a DM, or an option controlled by the highlighted DM: into the mode& by 
double-clickng the last item on the corresponding list; 
rriudi'y au esisting DM name or option description, by double-clicking <in that 
item: 
0 remoue a highlighted DM or option from the model, by pressing the "Delete" 
key on the keyboard. 
Sote that when a DM is removed, the options belonging to this DM are removed 
automatically. tVhile this dialog box is active, a simple description of how to rnodifv 
and remove items appears on the statu5 bar located at  the bottom of the GMCR 
II main mindom, mhich is not shown in Figure 4.2. 
Figure 1.2: The DM/Option Input Dialog Box 
Figure 4.3: Displaying DMs and Options in the Elmira Conflict Mode1 
The input from the Decision Makers and Options dialog box is read and stored 
hy the system. For simplicity, GMCR II uses only the short title or short description 
to indicate a DM or option; longer titles and descriptions are kept as a reference. 
.\ user can refer to this information at any later tirne by activating the property 
page tabbed by "DMs and Options", as shown in Figure 4.3. In this page, a tree 
view displays all the DMs, ail the options, and their relationships. 
The dialog box to input DMs and options is invoked via the menu "Modehg 1 
States 1 Generate Feasible -2. The necessary information is essentially the number 
of DhIs i ndved  in the conflict model, n, and number of options each DM controls: 
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mi, i = 1,2, , n, plus labels. These are the necessary input for the generation of al1 
mat hematically possible states and the determination of aliowable state transitions, 
as 1141 be discussed in Sections 4.3.4 and 4.4. 
4.3.2 Infeasible State Removal 
Since each option can be either selected or not selected, m options imply a total 
of 2m rnathematicaily possible states, constituting the set {O, 1)O . In practice, 
however, many of these states typically caonot occur. States that are infeasible for 
various reasons should be identified and removed from the model. 
In GhICR II, infeasible states can be specified by applying options constraints 
iinder one or more of the folionring four categories: 
1) irlutuaily Exclusive Options, 
1) *'At Least One" Option, 
3) Option Dependence, and 
4) Direct Specification. 
Figure 4.4 shows GMCR II's starting dialog box for the specification of infeasi- 
bilities. This dialog is invoked via the menu item "Modeling/States/Remove In- 
feasible ...". A user has the opportunity to indicate under which categories the 
infeasibilities are to be specified. For the illustrative Elmira contlict, only the b t  
two categories are used, and therefore only the upper two check boxes are turned 
on in Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: Starting Dialog Box for the Specification of Infeasibility 
4.3.2.1 Mutualiy Exclusive Options 
-1 set of options is mutually ezclusiue if at most one option from the set can be 
taken. If a set of options O, 5 O is designated as mutually exc!usive options, 
then dl the states in the set 
are specified as infeasible. 
The dialog box for the entry of mutually exclusive options is shown in Figure 
5 .  For the Elmira conflict model, only one set of mutually exclusive options is 
specified in Figure 4.5. In this case, Uniroyal can at most select one of its options 
Delay: Accept and Abandon. In the dialog box, the user can input and maintain a 
list of columns, each representing a set of mutually exclusive options, to the right 
Figure 4.5: Dialog Box for the Entry of Mutually Exclusive Options 
of the "Add" button. The user can check on the relevant boxes to the left of the 
-.\dd" button, and the selection wil l  be shown as a new column on the List, where 
the 3" marks are initially read-only. A highlighted column can be either deleted 
or modified. In the case of modification, the 'Y marks on the column will be open 
for any necessary changes, and wi l l  resurne read-only status when the highlight 
moves to another column. Just like for any other dialog box in GMCR II, a simple 
description of the operations appears on the status bar of the main window, while 
the dialog box is active. 
4.3.2.2 "At Least One" Option 
In the "at least one" dialog box, sets of options can be specified such that any 
state must contain at least one option fkom each set. If one of the sets specified is 
Od C O, then any state belonging to 
is considered infeasible. 
The dialog box for "at least one" input is shown in Figure 4.6. For the Elmira 
mnflict, Uniroyal must choose at least one from its listed options. The input mech- 
anism for this diaiog box is basically the same as for mutuaily exclusive options. 
In the implementation, determinhg whether a state is infeasible under this cate- 
g o y  is very fast and straightforward. Each column on the list actualIy corresponds 
to a rnask m(a binary format DOUBLEWORD) that designates a range of options 
in which the cornpliance with the "at least one" option specification is checked. For 
esample, the "ln column in Figure 4.6 corresponds to a mask 
32 bits -rn = ...... O O (binary) 
ahich indicates that among options 1, 2, and 3 the "at least one" constraint is 
applied. Then whether a state u is infeasible under this specification simply depends 
on whether b(u) & rn = O is tme. Here, & means the bit-& AND operator, 
nhich is available in C/C++. 
4.3.2.3 Option Dependence 
Cnder option dependence, two patterns (pa and pg )  are specified. A state that 
matches pattern p~ is feasible ody if it also matches pattern PB; or, pattern pa 
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Figure 4.6: Dialog Box for the Entry of "At Least One" 
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irnplies pattern PB. In this specification, my state u is infeasible if it belongs to 
the following set: 
{UE { 0 , 1 ) ~  1 ~ k p . 4 , ~  ~ P B )  
Figure 4.7 shows the dialog box for entering option dependence in GMCR II. 
In this diaiog box, a user can use the spin buttons to cycle through "Y", "N" or 
"-" to specify the upper and lower patterns. The context menu can be invoked 
hy a right-click to delete or modify an existing entry. Since there is no option 
clependence in the Elmira conflict model, the two entries in this figure are for the 
Flathead River Development Conflict Model, the context of which is outlined in 
[35. 531. There are two possible ways to interpret each column entry in this dialog 
box. The first is that the lower pattern is a necessary condition of the upper pattern; 
the second is that the upper pattern is a suficient condition of the lower pattern. 
In the case of the Flathead River Development Conflict Model (refer to [35] for 
relevant background information of this case) shom in Figure 4.7, both entries use 
the second interpretation. In this model, the Sage Creek Cod Limited (Sage Creek) 
lias three choices: to take Option 1 to continue the original development, to take 
Option 3 to rnodify the project to reduce environmental impacts, or to take neither 
option to simply stop the project. Likewise, another DM, the British Columbia 
Provincial Government (British Columbia) has three ivailable strategies: to issue 
a full license for the original project (option 3: Original), to issue a limited license 
for a modified project (option 4: Modification), or to deny a license for the project 
(neither option 3 or 4). The two input colurnns in Figure 4.7 mean that Sage 
Creek cannot build a project that exceeds the license imed  by British Columbia. 
If British Columbia denies a license (- - NN - - - -), then Sage Creek has to 
stop(iVN - - - - - -). Meanwhile, if British Column issues a limited ücense for 
a modified project (- - NY - - - -), then Sage Creek has to take a choice that 
Figure 4.7: Dialog Box for Entering Option Dependence 
rscludes full original development (N - - - - - --). 
Lsing the pattern rnatching technique introduced in Section 4.2.2, the assess- 
ment of the feasibility of a state is simple and efticient. What is interesting is that 
the information taken from this dialog box can be used not only for the generation 
of feasible states, but also in the calculation of allowable transitions betmeen feasi- 
ble states, particularily in determination of "forcing moves", for which details nrill 
he cliscussed in Section 4.4.4, 
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4.3.2.4 Direct Speciflcation 
The three methods of specifying infeasible states discussed earlier in this section are 
relatively user-friendly, and able to handle most of the real-world cases for infeasibil- 
ity specification. Homever, there is no guarantee that al1 types of infeasibilities can 
be easily expresed under the above three categories. As a supplementary means, 
the Direct Specification category is offered, under which statements each consisting 
of a logical combination of options can be input to specify infeasible states. 
The dialog box for direct specification of infeasible states is sho~vn in Figure 
4.8. For the Elmira conflict, al1 infeasible states were specified under the first 
two categories, so there is no need to use direct specification. Nonetheless, for 
illustration purposes, two staternents are shown in Figure 4.8. The one already on 
the list is equivalent to the specifications in Figure 4.5, and the one being added to 
the list equivalent to the specification in Figure 4.6. 
.A direct specification statement is expressed as a combination of available option 
iitimbers and logical connectives including negation ( W O T  or -), conjunction 
( '-XSD" or & ) and disjunction ("ORn or 1 ). Brackets are used to control the 
priority of operations in a statement. The interpretations of the two statements 
iiiput in Figure 4.8 are given in Table 4.1. As can be seen, each direct specification 
st aternent corresponds to one or more patterns which represent all states at which 
the statement is true. The transformation hom a direct specification statement 
to its corresponding infeasible pattern(s) is carried out automaticaiiy by GMCR 
11. Again, using the pst tern-matching techniques (4.2) introduced in Section 4.2.2, 
those states that are infeasible under this category can be easily identified. 
-4 specification entered in the edit box on the upper rîght of the dialog box 
ni11 be put into the list box below when the "Add to List" button is pressed. -4 
Figure 4.8: Dialog Box for Direct Specification of Infeasibilities 
Table 4.1: Interpretation and Corresponding Patterns of Direct Specificat ion State- 
tnents 
S t at ement Interpretation Infeasible Patt ern(s) 
2 & 3 1 3 & 4 1 4 & 2 Unirayal cannot both "Delay" and "Accept", ... - -YY- 
or both "Acceptn and "Abandon", or ... -yy- -  
both "Abandon" and "Deiay" . In other words, - Y - Y- 
it can take at most one fkom its options. 
- - - - - - - - - 
- 2 &  - 3 &  - 4  Uniroyal has to take at le& one of the options - - NNW- 
"Delay", "Accept" and "Abandon" 
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highlighted list item can 
the case of modification, 
be deleted or modifiecl by invoking the context menu. In 
the original text of the list item will be put back to the 
edit box for re-editing, and the label of the "Add to List" changed to "Confim 
1 Iodification" . 
.4 direct specification can be entered to the edit box in two different ways. A 
user could simply type into the edit box the logical combination of options. In this 
case, the options shom in the tree view on the left of the dialog box are used as 
a reference. The other way is to only use the mouse as input device - a click on 
a Ierf of the tree siew Nil1 enter the option number in the edit box, nrhile a click 
on the buttons in the middle of the dialog box niil1 enter a logical operator or a 
Ilracket. An "error preventing" feature is implemented in this dialog box for the 
srcond input method, as outlined in Table 4.2. When a row item has just been 
clicked to enter a character, there are always some column items to be disabled, 
preventing many possible input errors. For example, in Figure 4.8, since the option 
niimber 4 has just been entered, the "NOT button, the "(" button and the tree 
riew control (for entering option number) are disabled (grey), because they are 
irrelel-ant at this moment. 
4.3.3 Indzstzngu2shable State Combznat2on 
Sometimes in a conflict mode1 a group of states with a common pattern is indistin- 
yishable and, thus, should be treated as a single state. For example in the Elmira 
Confiict (Section 2.4), once Uniroyal abandons its Elmira plant, MoEYs and Local 
Go~ernment's choices are irrelevant. Thus, all states containhg the information 
that Uniroyal abandons its Elmira plant should be considered indistinguishable. 
The dialog box for coalescing indistinguishable states is shown in Figure 4.9. To 
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Table 4.2: Relevance of Input Sequences in Direct Specification Dialog 
spciFy which states are to be coalesced, users are required to provide the common 
characteristics of the states in the form of a pattern. As can be seen, a user can 
use the spin buttons to specify a pattern in the form of a column of "Y", "Y" and 
**-"S. Then the group of feasible states that matches the pattern d l  be combined 
into a single state. 
AND OR NOT ( 1 option t ree 
AND disabled disabled disabled disabled 
XOT disabled disabled disabled disabled disabled 
( disabled disa bled disabled disabled 
Because of the introduction of indistinguishable states, the definition of feasi- 
hle states given in Section 4.1 nonr needs to be refined. If two infeasible states 
I L I .  u2 E U are indistinguishable, mite ul - uz. Obviously, from the nature of 
iiidis t inguishablity, we have: 
1 
option tree 
1) ul -- U) * U* - U I  (symmetry); 
2) u -- ul (re f lexivity) ; 
disa bled 








Figure 4.9: Dialog Box for the Specifkation of Indistinguishable States 
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class containing u as ü = {ut 1 u' E U, u' - u)* The set of f w * b l e  and distinguish- 
able states is now defineci as: 
An equivalence class ü E U is called an atomic state if lül = 1; or a composite state 
if Iül > 1. The feasible states referred to earlier in this thesis are actually atomic 
states. 
Since an atomic state fi is a single-element set, fi = {u), it can be equiva- 
lently denoted by u. Hence the binary format representation and pattern-matching 
technique (4.2) presented in Section 4.2 remain valid for atomic states. 
Since a composite state and a pattem al1 represent a group of option combi- 
nations, there is no fundamental dinerence in their representation. For example, 
state 9 in Figure 4.1 is identical in representation to the pattem used to specify 
it in Figure 4.9. With respect to implementation, the two-mask data structure for 
patterns could also be used for composite states. However, in GMCR II, the data 
structure for composite states is slightly different fkom the one for patterns. For a 
composite stat e 6, define two DOUBLEWORD dush-indicator d(6) and Y-zndicator 
b(a) as follows: 
where 





1 if Vut E ii, ut(oi) = 1 
B(G, ai) = 
O othemise 
Obviously, when d(ii) = O, fi reduces to an atomic state, of which the binary 
representation is b(ü). In this thesis, an atomic state is also considered a special 
case of composite state under relevant context. 
-4 composite state ù is said to match a pattern p ( ü t p), if 
;\gaint in the implementation, the test of whether a composite state matches a 
pattern is broken d o m  into a few simple bit-wise operations: 
Proposition 4.2 A composite date ü matches pattern p (Le. 6 t p), iff 
,where " % ", *", andu 1 " are bit-wise AND, bit-wise exclusive OR, and bit-wise 
inclusive OR, respectiuely. 
For an atomic state, the condition 1) above is dways tme, so Proposition 4.2 is 
consistent with Proposition 4.1. 
In the remaining part of this thesis, "staten refers to a feasible and distinguish- 
able state, uniess otherwise indicated. For simplicity, the use of u to denote a state 
will be continued. 
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Generating the Feaszble and Dzstinguishable State List 
M'hen the information about DMs and options, as well as infeasibility and indis 
tinguishablity specifications have been entered, GMCR II automatically generates 
a listing of al1 feasible and indistinguishable states. Figure 4.10 depicts the major 
steps of this procedure: 
Step 1. Based on the number of options available to al1 DMs involved, rn, GMCR 
II generates a flow of al1 Zm mathematically possible states in a straightfor- 
ward rnanner. These are equivalent to al1 possible option combinations, each 
represented by a DOUBLEWORD: 
...... 00 -eOOO (binary) = O (deamal) 
...... 0O0-001 (binary) = 1 (decimal) 
...... 00=-0011 (binary) = 2 (decimal) 
...... 11 11 1 (binary) = ( l<m) - i (decimal) 
Here "<" means bit-wiee left shift, another low level operator available in 
C/C++. "l«n" is used to implement 2m more efficiently than the power 
function. 
Step 2. The system loops through each candidate from the above-mentioned flow 
to determine ahether it is feasible and distinct. The option constraints ob- 
tained from the infeasibility specification are used as a Hter. Measible states 
do not p a s  this filter and are removed fiom the model. The filtering proce- 
dure mas discussed in Section 4.3.2. In real-world confiict models, usually a 
considerable number of candidates are eliminated at  this step. 
Step 3. The coalescing of indistinguishable states from the feasible states resulting 
from step 2 is done using a "remove and add" approach. Since the feasible 
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states that p a s  step 2 come one-at-a-time, those that match an indistinguish- 
able pattern, and hence are to be included in a composite state, are removed 
first. 
Step 4. The composite states specified by the indistinguishable patterns are added 
to the model with the representation discussed in Section 4.3.3. However, a 
possible pit-fa11 here is that an indistinguishable pattern entered by the user 
may not be feasible. Therefore, each indistinguishable pattern is subject to a 
feasibility check before the composite state it corresponds is added to the list. 
G3ICR II conducts an alternative feasibility check for each indistinguishable 
pattern by keeping track of the number of feasible candidates removed under 
it in step 3. X pattern under which no candidate is eliminated is infeasible. 
Patterns that p a s  the feasibility check are added to the list as representations 
of composite states. 
Following this procedure, and taking advantages of the pattern matching techniques 
clescribed in Section 4.2.2, the generation of the feasible and distinguishable list is 
qiiite efficient, even for ïery large conflict models. For example, the model br the 
Triide in Sm-ices Conflict (documented and explained in [34, 401) possesses 6 DMs 
RIICI 20 options, and hence 2** = 1,048,576 mathematicdy possible states. On 
a personal cornputer with a 266rnHz Pentium II processor, it takes less than 30 
seconds to generate the 184,320 feasible states. 
Let the list of feasible and distinguishable states generated be 
Due to the \MY the list is generated, the atomic states come first in the kt. Assume 
tkat the £kt v states in the above list are atomic ones, and the rest are composite 
DMs and Options 1- Possible States 
i i i i i i i '  
I t t I I I I )  
lndistinguishable 
@ K i i i i i  
Patterns +k - 3 - 1 1 1  
1 1 : : :  
i i i i  
I I I I ,  
I l I I I  
1 1 1 1 1  
I l l 1 1  
I l # l l  
I l I > l  




Figure 4.10: Generating the List of Feasible and Indist inguishable States 
ones. Typical models have only a few composite states; most of the list is occupied 
by atomic states. Observe that the order of the candidates produced in step 1 above 
gives 
O 5 b(ul) < b(u2) < * * < b(uv) < 2m (4-7) 
R.cc:all that sometimes the index is ais0 used to identify a state, as discussed in 
Section 4.6. GSICR II uses a dynamically allocated array to store the set of feasible 
iind distinguishable states. The access time for an indexed state is constant and is 
iiiclependent of the array size. 
In GMCR II, the list of feasible and distinguishable states once generated, is 
made available in a user-friendly display as shown in Figure 4.1. This display c m  
1)r Ixought up at any later time. Outside the context of this section, the feasible 
ancl clistinguishable states are sometimes also referred to as feasible states for short. 
4.4 Allowable Transitions 
S t d e  tnrnsztion is the process by which a conflict model moves fiom one state to 
mot lier. If a DM can cause a state transition on his or her onni, then this transition 
is cnlled a trnilateml move (UM) for that DM. As denoted in Section 4.6, if there 
is a LM by DM i from uk to y,  then &(uk, uq) = 1. The list of d states to which 
DhI i has a UM hom state uk is Si(uk). AUowable state transitions constitute an 
important modehg component, which determines the structure of a graph model. 
In the onginal option fom, it is assumed that a DM has a UM fiom one state 
to another if and only if the two states diEer only in one or more options controiied 
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by that DM. In other words, the original option form assumes that 
&(IL*, u,) = 1 (2.e. uq E Si(u&)) Voj E o\oi, uk(oj) = uq(oj) (4.8) 
Sote that the original option form did not include the concept of indistinguishable 
states; al1 states were considered atomic. Thw, the state transitions for a mode1 are 
implied by the input information about DMs and options, as discussed in Section 
4.3.1. Also 
In fact, it is these assumptions that lead to the limitations of the option form 
oiitiined in Section 2.4. In GMCR II? the transition aspect of option form is im- 
poved by int roducing option-based irreversibility. 
In an irreversible transition or imuersible moue, a DM can, for instance, uni- 
liiterally cause a state transition fiom state uk to u,, but cannot make the reverse 
niove From u, to uk. In GMCR II, the right hand side of (4.8) is used as a d e f d t  
riecessary condition but not a sufncient condition. A user can specify irreversibiüty 
by a pplying some restrictions to t his condition. 
In GMCR II: irreversibility can be specsed based either on a single option or on 
rniilt iple options. 
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4.4.2.1 Single Option Based Irreversibility 
-4 state transition by a DM from one state to another could be infeasible even 
if the tmo states M e r  only in one or more options controlled by that DM. This 
occurs, for instance, when an option is irreversible - after the option is selected 
it cannot be reversed. For example, in the Elmira model, if the DM Uniroyal 
cliooses the option "delay", it cannot take this move back later, because time is 
irrevenible. Figure 4.11 shows the GMCR II dialog box where a user can indicate 
the irreversible options. .4 "ONE WAY9 arrom from "N" to "Y" beside an option 
iiieatis that changes in the selection of that option are permitted only from 'i (not 
st.Lctecl) to Y (selected). Likenrise, an anow from "Y" to "N" means the option 
( m i i i i  only be changed €rom Y (selected) to N (not selected). .A bidirectional arrow. 
t lie default status, means no restriction on the change of the option. The user can 
msily double-click an m o w  to toggle an arrow type. 
The information contained in this dialog box can be surnmarized as a mapping: 
Gl ICR II applies the following restrictions on the allowable state transitions be- 
twen two atomic states u k  and u,, 1 5 k 5 u, l < q 5 u, based on the above 
specification: 
oj c-t ~ ( 0 ~ )  = 4 
f 
O if the selection of option oj can only 
be changed from not selected to selected 
1 if the selection of o p t i o v  cari only 
be changed from selected to not selected 
2 otherwise 
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Figure 4.11: Dialog Box for Specifying Irreversible Options 
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To check whether a state transition is infeasible based on these restrictions is very 
efficient in implementation: 
where " Sr " and "<" are bit-wise AND and bit-vise LEFT-SHIFT, respectively. 
When composite states are involved, the following conventions are made based 
on modeling practice: 
For an atomic state u and a composite state ü, 
ii E Si(u) H 3u'E Ü,U'€ Si(u) 
For two composite states fi' and ü", 
The information shom in the above dialog box happens to be sufncient to define 
al1 irreversible moves in the illustrative Elmira mode1 (refer to Table 2.3 and Figure 
2.1). However, in some situations, selection restrictions on multiple options, rat her 
than on a single option, are needed. 
4.4.2.2 Multiple Option Based Irreversibility 
The GMCR II dialog box for irreversibility specification based on multiple options 
is shom in Figure 4.12. In this dialog, the user is asked to enter a pair of patterns 
Fi y r e  4.12: Dialog Box for Irreversibility Specification based on Multiple Options 
such that the move from the left pattem to the right pattern is not allowed. -4 list of 
pat tem pairs can be maintained in the area to the rîght of the "Add" button. This 
clialog offers easy deletion and modification functions. The two pairs displayed 
in Figure 4.12 (one is already on the kt, the other is being added to Iist) are 
for the Softwood Lumber model, details of which can be found in [38]). Note 
that this dialog box has the capacity to specify infeasible movement between any 
pair of states, because even an atomic state c m  be envisioned as a pattem - one 
nithout "-" . Also, any irreversible option s p d e d  in Figure 4.11 can also be 
equivaiently input in this dialog, in the form of a infeasible movement between two 
patterns. For example, the first right arrow in Figure 4.11 can be represented as  
( N - - - - ) f  (Y---- ). Of course, for irreversible options, the dialog box in 
Figure 4.11 is more efficient. 
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Again, the pattem-matching technique (4.2,4.5) is used to implement this method 
of picking out prohibited transitions. 
4.4.3 Calculatzon of Reachabzlzty 
With the information elicited from the specification of irreversibility based on both 
single option and multiple options, the reachable list from each state for each DM 
can be calculated. .\ straightfonvard implementation for calculating a reachable 
iist Si(u) W O U I ~  be: 
Step 1. Obtain a state from the feasible state list as candidate. If the end of the 
list is reached, stop. 
Step 2. Check whether the incoming candidate differs from u only on one of more 
options that DM i controls. If yes. go to 3: otherwise, go to 1. 
Step 3. Check whether the candidate passes the test based on the specification in 
Section 4.4.2.1. If yes, go to 4; otherwise, go to step 1. 
Step 4. Check whether the candidate passes the test based on the specification in 
Section 4.4.2.2. If, yes, add the candidate into Si(u); otherwise, go to step 1. 
The above procedure was actudy adopted in earher versions of GMCR II. In the 
worst case, nhen ail rnathematicdy possible states are feasible, the complexity for 
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the above implementation is O(2"). This can harm the performance of the system 
when the mode1 is large. 
To improve the system's capacity to deal with large models, an innovative strat- 
egy is used to reduce the complexity of the above algorithm. lnstead of looping 
through all feasible states, the scope of the search can be limited to a much smailer 
candidate set. For simplicity, only atomic states are discussed below. Composite 
states required a different treatment, but since only a very mal1 portion of states 
are composite, their contribution to the cornplexity is negligible in any case. 
Denote the binary representation of u by 
b(u) = XXXX X- .Xa ((binary). 
DM, 
Then each state that differs from u only on options that DM i controls has one of 
the following binary representations: 
XXXX 1 . - i l  XXX 
Therefore the full-range loop in step 1 of the original algorithm is unnecessary; the 
loop need only cover the entries in (4.10). To build such a loop, 
the starting entry is 
the ending entry is 
the increment for each entry is la: mk. 
In particular, al1 the components needed to form the limited-range loop are con- 
wniently obtained from bit-wise operations AND ( & ), INCLUSIVE-OR ( 1 ) and 
LEFT-SHIFT (<). Using this new loop to replace steps 1 and 2 in the original 
algorithm reduces the complexity from 0(2m) to average 0(2m/n) in the rvorst case. 
This is a considerable saving in execution tirne because when the size of a mode1 
iiicreases. the number of DMs. n. usually also increases. Moreover, this saving 
appears in the calculation for the reachable list from each states for each DM. 
The above technique works weil when all mathematicaliy possible states are 
feasible. In t his case, the binaxy representation of a state directly corresponds to the 
index of the state on the feasible state list (see Section 4.3.4), and hence identifies 
the state. However, the state index does not depend on the binary representation, 
ahen infeasible states are removed. In this case, how to i d e n t e  the candidate at 
the feasible state list becornes a new question. Of course, an exhaustive search 
over the feasible state list for each binary candidate is the easiest way to fùid its 
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index. But the extra cornplexity introduced would diminish the validity of this new 
approach. 
GMCR II takes advantage of the monotonie relation between the binary r e p  
resmtations and the indices of atomic states (4.7), and use binary search [Il to 
acldress this problem. A procedure based on "decremental binary searches" is car- 
ried out in GMCR II and depicted in Figure 4.13. The main steps of this procedure 
are outline as follows: 
1. First, let the binary candidates (4.10) go through the feasibility tests as de- 
scribed in Section 4.3.2. Usually quite a few candidates are eliminated at  this 
step. 
II. Second, Steps 3 and 4 above also d e  out a considerable portion of the re- 
maining candidates. 
III. Third, for rernaining binary candidates c k  (k = 1, , r ) ,  "decremental binary 
searches' are used to identify their indices I(ck) (k = 1 ,  , r  ) before t hey 
are added to the reachable list. 
- For aach c k ,  let the starting index of binary search be is (Q) , 1 5 à&) < 
v ,  where v is the maximum index for atomic states (4.6). Notice that 
we have I ( y )  > I ( q - J ,  k = 2, , r. Therefore, if 
Initiai 
S tate Candidates 
1 Feasibility Test 1 
1 Ihlultiple Option Based 1 1 
Figure 4.13: The Improved Procedure for Calculation of a Reachable List 
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This means that the binary searches described below for the indices of 
the remaining candidates can be performed on decreasing nested scopes. 
That is why this approach is d e d  "decremental binary searches". 
- For ck, perforrn a binary search on [zs(ck), Y] :  
i. Let B = is(ck) and E = W. Take the midde index M = [(B + E)/2] 
and compare q with b(uM). 
ii. If cc < b(uM)? let E = M, and repeat 1. If ck > b(uM), let B = M l  
and repeat 1. If q = b(aM), then I(q) = M ,  end. 
iii. This procedure always fin& l ( ck ) ,  because c& has been pre-checked 
for feasibility. 
Because of the pre-checks and the decreasing scopes, the extra complexity factor 
ridded by this procedure to the new algorithm would be much smaller than O(m). 
This innomthe strategy for calculating reachable lists geatly enhances GMCR II's 
capacity in handling large scale models. 
The 'oAIIowable Transitions" property page in GMCR II, as shown in Figure 
4.14. allows the user to view the reachable list of any state by any DM. In this 
page, the user can pull d o m  the combo box to select the focal DM. The initial state 
slion?i as the column to the lefk of the double-mom can be altered by changing the 
state number using the spin button or direct editing. The states on the reachable 
list appears instantly with the selection of the focal DM and/or the initial state. 
4.4.4 Forc2ng Moues 
Under some circumstances, a DM who makes a certain move from a state may give 
one or more other DMs no choice but to respond with uforced" moves that result 
Figure 4.14: Displayhg a Reachable List 
in another state. In this way, the DM who initiates the forcing moue achieves a 
transition from the initial state to the final states as if it were "unilateral", even 
though the two states differ on the options that he or she does not control. Forcing 
moves constitute an exception to the default necessaxy condition (right hand side 
of (4.8)) for determining UMs, so the original option form, and even earlier versions 
of GMCR II, did not include this concept. The tenn ''forcing rnove" was first used 
in the proposal of this thesis, and later in [37]. 
Table 4.3 gives an example of a forcing move in the context of the Flathead 
River Resource Development Conflict model, which mas studied using GMCR II in 
[35]. In the model, the provincial govemment (British Columbia) can move from 
state 3 by changing its strategy from issuing a full license (YN) to denying any 
liccnse (33). hnother DM, Sage Creek, has no choice but to move accordingly, 
from developing a full project (YN) to stopping the project (NN). The model thus 
moves from state 3 to state 1 as a consequence of British Columbia's initial move. 
State 3 and 1 differ not only on British Columbia's options, but also on Sage Creek's 
options. yet British Columbia can be modeled as achieving the transition from st ate 
3 to state 1 "unilaterallyn. 
The dialog box presented in Figure 4.7 was developed for specification of infea- 
sible states under the option dependence category. However, looking at the first 
specification in Figure 4.7 and envisionhg the upper pattern (pA: - - NN - - - -1 
as a "forcing pattern" and the lower pattern (pB:  HN - - - - - -)) 'Yorced pat- 
tern'., one fin& that the forcing rnove to state 1 in Table 4.3 is actually irnplied 
in that specification. Therefore, no extra input dialog is needed to specify forcing 
moves; the option dependence dialog serves this purposes as well. 
Since State 1 is not even on the candidate list (4.10) for calculating the reach- 
able list for state 3 according to the procedure outlined in Section 4.4.3, a special 
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Table 4.3: Exam~k of a Forcine: Move 
Sage Creek 
1 .  Continue Y Y + N  
2 .  Modih N N N 
British Columbia 
3. Original Y + N  X 
4 .  Modifmtion N X N 
Montana 
5. Oppose N N N 
St ate Xumbers 3 ;~r 1 
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treatment must be attached to that procedure. In Table 4.3, British Columbia can 
he interpreted to make a UM fiom state 3, resulting in the state combination given 
in the middle column (*) in the table, from which Sage Creek has a UM to state 
1. (*) was deemed infeasible by the first specification in Figure 4.7, and hence 
does not exist in the model. Nonetheless, this "ghost state" can be envisioned as 
a "refractor" that quickly transfers British Columbia's UM from state 3 to Sage 
Creek's U M  to state 1. 
Based on this interpretation, the identification of a forcing move in the calcu- 
lation of a reachable list can start from identification of the "refractor". Yote that 
the move by the focal DM from the initial state to the "refractor" is a genuine UM, 
;incl hence the "refractor" appears in the candidate list (4.10). Therefore, step 1 
in  the procedure for calculating reachable lists in Section 4.4.3 can be rnodified as 
follotvs (Figure 4.13): 
1'. Test al1 binary candidates (4.10) for feasibility. Send those that p a s  to II. 
For each candidate that fails the test, compare it with each upper pattern 
(pA> or Vorcing patternn) specified under option dependence. 
- If a candidate does not match a ''forcing" pattern. eliminate it: 
- If a candidate b(ut) matches a ''forcing" pattern p ~ ,  transform it to a 
new candidate b(utf) based on the "forced" pattern p ~ :  
Remove b(uf) and send b(u") as a remaining candidate to step II. 
For the forcing move example in Table 4.3, the candidate from state 3 repre- 
smting the "refiactor" does not pass the feasibility test, but does match a "forcing" 
pattern. Applying the transformation (4.13) to it yields state 1. State 1 then passes 
al1 rernaining steps and eventually joins the reachable kt of state 3. In this way, 
the latest version of GMCR II successNly incorporates forcing moves. 
4.4.5 Common Moves 
A Cornmon moue is a new concept introduced in the context of graph model. -4 
tammon move refers to the possibility of tmo or more DMs to independently making 
itiiilateral rnoves that cause the rnodel to move from a particular initial state to the 
siiinc target state. Common moves do exist in the real world. For example, Fang, 
Mipel and Kilgour use common moves in a superpower nuclear confrontation model 
r o  illustrate the adlantages in flexibility of gaph model over the option form and 
normal form [20, Ch.21. 
In the nuclear confrontation model, DMs 1 and 2 have three strategies: peace 
(label P)? conventional attack (label C), and full nuclear attack (label W) which is 
nssitmed to trigger a nuclear winter. The five distinct States possible are labelled 
as (PP). (PC)? (CP), (CC) and (W). The gaph model is illustrated in Figure 4.15; 
ilote t hat the moves from (PP): (PC): (CP) and (CC) to (W) are common movs  
a w  ila ble to ei t her player. 
Since a common move must violate the default necessary condition for a UM, it 
cannot be handled in the original option form. Common moves are not implemented 
in the current version of GMCR II, due to the fact that they cannot be represented 
1. single Y-%"-" columns; also they do not occur very often in practice. However, 
the implementation of common moves in the GMCR II framework is in principle 
possible, as 4 1  be illustrated below. 
Consider the option form model presented in Table 4.4. The columns on the 
Figtir~ 4.16: Graph Mode1 for Superpower Nuclear Confrontation: (a) Graph for 
DJI 1: (b) Graph for DM 2. 
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Table 4.4: Option Form for Superpower Nuclear Confrontation Model 
DMs and Options 1 Feasible States 
riglit are the feasible states under the GMCR II specification that both options 1 
iiiicl 2. and options 3 and 4, form two sets of mutually exclusive options. As can be 
swn. states 1, 2, 4 and 5 correspond to states (PP), (CP), (PC) and (CC) in the 
grapli model in Figure 4.15. Recall that the logical combinations of options are used 
iii GMCR II for the direct specification of infeasibility (Section 4.3.2.4, Figure 4.8). 
0111-iously the same design could be used to specify indistinguishability as well (it 
w s  actually implemented in an earlier version of GMCR II). If we specify that al1 
states satisfving the statement '2 1 4" are indistinguishable, then a composite state 
roiisisting of  th^ atomic states 3, 5: 6,  7, 8 and 9 in Table 4.4 Nil1 be ohtained. This 
rornposite state represents the state (W) in Figure 4.15. 
Superpower 1 
1. Conventional Attack 
2.FuHNuclearAttack 
Superpower 2 
3. Conventional Attack 
4, Full Nuclear Attack 
State Number 
Son., consider the state transitions. Obviously, once a hl1 nuclear attack is 
launched, the disastrous e f k t  is irreversible. Consequently, options 2 and 4 should 
be specified as irreversible options that can only be changed £rom not selected to 
selected, and not vice versa. Recalling the convention (4.9) of Section 4.4.2.1, one 
noa h d s  the specifications of indistinguishable states and irreversible options in 
G .\ [CR II's improved option form, actually determine state transitions identical to 






























Y N N Y N  
N Y N N Y  
Y Y N N N  
7 
N Y Y Y  
8 9 
(W) 1 (W) (W) 
Superpower 2 I 
Tahie 4.5: State Transitions in Superpower Nuclear Confrontation 3Iodel 
sliown in a format similar to normal fonn as in Table 4.5. In this table, solid arronTs 
a tid dot t ed arronrs represent Superpower 1's and Superpower 2's ULIS, respectivel. 
with common moves indicated by circles. Note that the shaded area represents a 
siiigle composite state (W). 
In conclusion, there is no fundamental difficulty to incorporate common mores in 
GSICR II. One reason why common moves are not implemented in current version 
lies in the representation of states. Because of the logical connective OR ( 1 ) in the 
statenient specifying a common move, a common move cannot be represented by a 
single Y-N- "-" column. If more occasions of common moves arise in real-world case 
studies, it should not be too difficult for future versions of GMCR II to get around 
tliis representation issue. An interesthg observation here is that although option 
dependence and indistinguishability specification were originally intended for use 
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iu generating the state list, they also play a role in determining state transitions, 
specifically, forcing moves and common moves. 
4.5 Preferences 
4.5.1 Ordtnal Preferences in GMCR II 
Pr~f~rr i ice  information about the feasible states is the last. and perhaps the most 
itnport ant input required for a stability analysis under the Graph Mode1 for Conflict 
Rcsoliition paradigm. In GMCR II, a flexible rnethodology is presented for conve- 
nieritly eliciting a DM'S relative preferences. More specifically, three techniques are 
;i1:iilnble for ordering the states from most to least preferred, with ties permitted. 
One method is Option Weighting, in which meights are assigned to each option 
rhoice, and total weights used to determine an ordering of states. A second tech- 
iiique is to employ an Option Pnoritiring scheme, based upon a set of lesicographic 
st iit~ments. Subsequently, one can rank the states manually using a process called 
Fine Tuning or Direct Ranking. Figure 4.16 depicts hom these three techniques can 
I)r iitilized to determine the preferences of a particular DM. The name of the focal 
Dl[. whose preference information is currently being elicited, appears on the title 
I ) N L  
The most reliable method of ordinal preference elicitation would be to list eu- 
tiaustively the pair-wise cornparisons among feasible states. However, it is usually 
impractical to do so unless the mode1 is very small. In fact, the most usefiil method 
t hat works explicitly with states is Direct Runiking, also called Fine Tuning. 
But more efficient stilî are Option Weighting and Option Prioritizing, which 
are implicit ranking methods based on options. Because the number of options is 
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Figure 4.16: Dialog Box for Relative Preference Elicitation 
much srnaller than the number of states, Option Weighting and Option Prioritizing 
are much more efficient for moderate and large-size conflict rnodels. As shown 
on the left of the dialog box in Figure 4.16, either of these two techniques can 
be chosen to input a prehinary raaking of states. Both Option Weighting and 
Option Prioritizing have their limitations and might not catch al1 the details of the 
preferences. Therefore, it is usually recommended t hat the state ranking obtained 
from either Option Weighting or Option Prioritizing be refined by Direct Ranking. 
For conflict models of very large size, on-screen Fine Tuning may not be prac- 
tical, and thus can be inactivated by unchecking the corresponding checkbox on 
tlie clialog box. On the other hand, if a conflict model is small so that on-screen 
manipulation alone could be sufficient , then the preliminary ranking using Option 
\\éighting or Option Prioritizing can likewise be skipped. The detailed features of 
tliese three techniques are introduced in the following sections. The Elmira conflict 
model has only nine states, and is in fact typical of the group for which prefer- 
erice information is best input by Direct Ranking. However, Option Weighting and 
Option Prioritizing are performed on this model to illustrate how each technique 
worh. An advantage of using this codlîct for illustration purpose is that this model 
is small enough that complete preference rankings can be displayed on one screen. 
Application of these approaches to obtain and represent ordinal preference infor- 
mation d o m  GMCR II to model real-world codiicts expeditiously, and analyze 
t hem effectively. Initial research on ordinal preferences representation, elicitation 
and processing nms previously presented in [?II. 
Option Weighting is straightforward and simple to use in practice. For a @en 
clecision maker, each option 4 E O can be aaigned a numencal weight W(ok),  
nhich may be a positive or negative number, according to its importance and 
clesirability to that decision maker. The more important an option, the greater the 
magnitude of the weight assigned to it. Negative weights indicate options that the 
clecision maker prefers not be selected. Figure 4.17 shows GMCR II's dialog box for 
a i t  ry of option weights. In t his dialog, the default weight for each option is set to O 
mtl  listed beside the option. .4 user can simply click on the ce11 to edit the number 
as desirecl. When the edit focus moves to another cell, or the return key is pressed, 
tlit. editing is considered finished. If some illegal characters (e.g. non-number key) 
are entered, GMCR II resets the input weight to its default value O. Contained in 
the dialog box in Figure 4.17 is an illustrative set of option weights input for Mol3 in 
the Elmira conflict model. Concerned about the economic benefits a Company like 
Criiroyal can offer the local community and in turn the province, MoE is influenced 
Ily tlie firm's ultimate threat - abandonment. Consequently, option 4,in which 
tlie Cniroyal abandons its Elmira operation, is assigned a negative weight 1~4th 
;i r ~ l a t i d y  higli magnitude of -20. It is reasonable to expect that MoE n70uld 
Iw happy if Cniroyal accepts the current Control Order, and, almost to the same 
degree, would dislike Uniroyal to delay the procedure. Therefore, the weights on 
options 2 and 3 are set to be of equal magnitude, but one negative (-10) and one 
positive ((10). Likemise, option 1 is given a s m d  negative weight (-5)? because MoE 
is somewhat reluctant to modify its original Control Order. The local government's 
option is assigned a weight O, reflecting that MoE is not r e d y  sure mhether its 
position is improved if the Local Governent sticks to the onginai Control Order. 
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Figure 4.17: Diahg Box for Option Weighting 
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In Option Weighting, a score M(u) for each feasible state u E U is calculated 
based on the option weights assigneci. It represents the focal decision maker's pref- 
erences over states as a consequence of his or her preferences on options. Analogous 
to many multiple criteria decision meking (MCDM) problems, there are many possi- 
ble combinations of weights that produce the same preference ranking. But Option 
Rkighting has a "monotonicity" property - that is, if the weight on an option is 
increased, then states in rhich that option is chosen will either move upward in the 
ranlcing or stay in the sarne position. 
In GMCR II, a natural scheme is chosen: for a given atomic state, the weights 
are summed across the options to obtain a score for that state 
For a composite state, a representative atomic state that it contains is chosen to 
receive the score. In GMCR II, the practice is that the "-"s are considered "N" 
in calculating the score for a composite state. Subsequently, GMCR II ranks the 
states using quick-sort [l] from most preferred to l e s t  preferred based on their 
scores. For example, based on the option weights assigned as shown in Figure 4.17, 
Figure 4.18 displays the resulting state ranking generated by GMCR II for MoE. 
Of course, equally preferred states occur when scores' are equal. A set if equally 
prefened states is indicated in GMCR II by a group of columns having a common 
colored backgrounds. In Figure 4.18, states 7 and 3, 4 and 8, 1 and 5, and 2 and 6 
are each an equdy  preferred group. As can be seen, this ranking is quite close to 
the final ranlting as giwn in Table 2.4. The Direct Ranking will take over the rest 
of the job. 
It is not unusuai that many techniques usecl in models designed to handle ordinal 
data' including option weighting, deal with the data in a cardinal fashion [Ml. Note 
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Figure 4.18: State Ranking for MoE in Elmira Conflict Mode1 Obtained from Op- 
t ion Weight ing 
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that the magnitude of the scores is not meaningful; scores are simply a useful device 
to determine relative preferences. It should also be noted that there are many 
preference orderings over states that cannot be constructed ushg option weighting. 
A detailed discussion on this issue can be found in [51]. 
The Option Prioritizing approach in GMCR II (71) constitutes a generalization of 
the "preference tree" method originally suggested by Fraser and Hipel [27], and 
Iater reported upon by Hipel and Meister [40] and Fraser [23, 241. The "preference 
t ree*' met hod cvas implemented in DecisionMaker [29]. However, due to unilater- 
allfs particular implementation strategy and close coupling between modeling and 
analusis, the "preference t reen met hod is essentially "option-centeredn as opposed 
to %tatement-centered". Accordhgly, a variety of restrictions appear in Decision- 
llaker which seriously handicap its capability to represent preference information. 
For esample, in DecisionMaker, a logical conditionals must be interpreted as "if 
and only if"; logical connectives must be either AND'S or OR'S, but not a mixture 
of both; options appearing in the hypothesis of a conditional of statement must 
have appeared in a previous statement, and hence the first statement can never be 
rondit ional; etc. In contmst , GMCR II's Option Priontizing is statement-centered, 
and none of the above limitations applies. 
In Option Prioritizing, the user is asked to provide an ordered set of preferrnce 
statements for each DM. Each preference statement R takes a tmth value, either 
True (T) or False (F), at each particdar state. A statement that has higher priority 
in determinhg preferences appears earlier in the set. The preferences over states 
can be determineci in the following way: 
Let {Cll, Q2,. . . , Clk) be the set of statements. A state ul is preferred to a state 
1 4  # U, if and only if 3 j ,  O < j 5 k, such that 
F iyre  4.19 shows the input dialog box in GMCR II for eüciting a set of pref- 
twnce statements for a focal DM. The operations for this dialog box are similar 
to tliose of Figure 4.8. Extra controls in the input area include a combo box for 
sprcif~<ng whet her a conditional or a non-conditional statement is to be input, 
ancl, if conditional, what type of condition to be used. If the user chooses to in- 
put a non-conditional statement (default), the edit box for entering the condition, 
hecomes irrelevant and therefore disabled. One important attribute of the set of 
preference statement is that order matters, so GMCR II allows the user to move a 
Iiiglilighted list item to any position in the Est by dragging. The title of the focal 
Dl 1 is sliown on the title bar, so the user is reminded whose preference information 
is I~eing entered. 
In GMCR II, preference statements are expressed in terms of options and log- 
ical connectives. A preference statement can be non-conditional, conditional, or 
hi-conditional. A non-conditional statement is expressed as a combination of a d -  
able option numbers, plus comectives including negation ( 'botn or -) , conjunctîon 
("and" or &) and disjunction ("or" or 1 ). Brackets ("(" and ")") are used to control 
the priority of operations in a statement. In this sense, non-conditional preference 
statements are no Werent hem direct specification statements as introduced in 
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Figure 4.19: Dialog Box for Entering Option Prioritizing Preference Statements 
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Section 4.3.2.4. Negation (-) preceding an option number indicates that the de- 
cision rnaker prefers the option not to be taken. For example, the first preference 
statement (-4) for MoE shown in Figure 4.19 means that option 4, abandonment 
of the Elmira operation by Uniroyal, is what MoE prefers not to happen. The 
relative importance of a preference statement is reflected by its position in the iist: 
a statement that occupies a higher place in the list, is more important in determin- 
ing the decision maker's preferences. In the Elmira example, the ultimate threat 
of L'niroyal's abandonment of its Elmira operation, which would have a negative 
effect on the province's economy, is MoE's greatest concern. This statement is true 
(T) kit any state for which option 4 is not selected, and false (F) othenvise. In the 
Elmira conflict model, for instance, this statement is true (T) at each of the first 
eiglit states in Table 4.1 and fdse (F) at state 9. 
A conditional or bi-conditional statement consists of two non-conditional state- 
inents connected by an "IF" or "IFF" . For example, the last statement in the list in 
Figure 4.19 is a bi-conditional statement "5 IFF -ln, which means that MoE would 
like to see Local Governments's support of the original Control Order if and only 
if itself chooses not to modify the Control Order. Likewise, the third statement 
for Local Government, "3 IF -IV, as will be shown in Table 4.7, is a conditional 
statement meaning that Local Government would üke to see Uniroyal accept the 
Control Order (3), provided it is not modified (-1). The truth value of a conditional 
or bi-conditional statement at  a state depends on the truth values of its two non- 
conditional components according to the conditional or bi-conditional truth tables 
clefined in mathematical logic [?8]. For example, according to the conditional truth 
table, statement "3 IF -ln is considered to be true at  any state in mhich option 1 
is selected (and hence -1 is false). 
Even though GMCR II has the capacity to handle quite complicated logical 
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combinations of options, most human DMs' preferences tend to be expresed in 
rather simple preference statements. Compare MoE's preference statements with 
its option weights as specified and interpreted in Section 4.5.2, and one can find 
t liat t hey almost reflect exactly the same reasonable preference information, except 
when option 5 is considered. Option weighting cannot assign a non-zero weight 
to option 5 because it cannot express conditional information. We will see that 
appropriate lexicographic preference statements for MoE produce a state ranking 
identical to the final ranking in Table 2.4- no fine-tuning is needed. Generally 
spraking, Option Priontizing can express richer and more flexible preference in- 
forniation than option weighting, and hence should be preferred by users who feel 
cornfortable r i th  this methodology. The lexicographic preference statements for 
the other two DAIS, Uniroyal and Local Government, are giwn in Tables 4.6 and 
4.7. respectively, together with interpretations. These statements al1 make good 
sense in the context of the confiict model, and the resulting state rankings are gen- 
~ra l ly  close, and often identical, to the final rankings. Note that the first statement 
iri Table 4.6. and third and fourth statements in Table 4.7 would not be allowed in 
DecisionY aker [29]. 
-4 tree presentation of ordinal preferences can be described as follows. For a 
particular DM, an? set of states or alternatives can be split into two subsets, where 
aiiy state in the first subset is preferred to any state in the second subset. This 
splitting process can be applied successively to the subsets, forming a binary tree. 
A complete ranking can eventudy be achieved. Each tirne a set or subset of states 
is split ( i e .  at each level of the binary tree), a preference statement serves as the 
criterion goveniing this bifurcation. In other words, a set of preference statements 
controls the structure of the preference tree. The tree presentation that corresponds 
to the set of preference statements in Tabie 4.7 is shown in the upper part of Figure 
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Table 4.6: Lexicographie Preference Statements and Interpretation for Uniroyd 
S tatement Interpretation 
3 IFF 1 Uniroyal would be ready to accept the Control Order if 
and only if it has been modified to be more acceptable to 
Uniroyai 
-4 Uniroyal does not iike to abandon its Elmira operation 
-5 Uniroyal hates to see Local Government insist ing that 
the originai Control Order not be modified 
2 I FF - 5 Uniroyal would like t. delay the procedure if and only 
if Local Government's attitude is softened 
Talde 4.7: Lesicographic Preference Statements and Interpretations for Local Gov- 
ernment 
S tatement Interpretation 
Concerned about the negative consequence on the 
local economy, Local Government does not like to 
see Uniroyal abandon its Elmira operation. 
Locd Government prefers that the original Control 
Order not be modified. 
Local Government likes to see Uniroyai accept the 
Control Order, if it is an unmodified one. 
Local Government would insistently ask for the 
original Control Order if MoE tends to modify it. 
Local Government dues not like to see the dehy of 
the procedure. 
After all, Local Government still tends to insist on 
the original Control Order. 
Figure 4.20: Tree Presentation of Option Prioritizing 
4.20. Yote that the tree has some "empty Ieavesn because of the prior removal of 
iiifeasible states. As can be seen, a few preference statements can represent a rather 
çomples tree. In other mords, lexicographie preference statements are a compact 
representation of a preference tree. Another observation here is that a conditional 
statement (e.g. "3 IF -lm), as opposed to a bi-conditioinal (in) statement, can help 
to localize preference judgements. 
An equivalent scheme that can result in the same ranking as in the tree presen- 
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tation is to assign a "scoren *(u) to each state according to its truth values when 
the statements are applied. Assume k is the total number of statements that have 
Iwen provided, and denote by i I j (u )  the incrementd score to state u based upon 
statement Rj,O < j 5 k. Define 
2'-j if Rj(u) =T 
O othemise 
Tlic states can then be sorted according to their scores using quick-sort [l], tvhich 
will result in esactly the same ranking as that from the tree presentation. This 
**scoring" scheme is illustrated in the lower part of Figure 4.20. The implementation 
of Option Priontizing in GMCR II is based on this scheme. Again, it is emphasized 
tliat even though a cardinal "score" is involved, it only plays a temporary role in 
d~ t~rmin ing  the ranking; GMCR II requires on- ordinal preference information. 
Tlie scores given at the bottom of Figure 4.20 as well as the preference tree at the 
top list the states from the moa  preferred on the left to the least preferred on the 
rialit. This resulting ranking is identical to the final ranking given in Table 2.4. 
The state rankings GMCR II produces for MoE and Uniroyal, based on the 
lesicographic preference statements for each of them provided earlier, are s h o w  in 
Figures 4.21 and 4.22, respectively. Compared with the final rankings in Table 2.4, 
MoES ranking is identical, and o d y  a single preference reversed occurs on a pair 
of st at es (2 and 7) in Uniroyal's ranking, mhich c m  be easily h e d  by Fine Tuning. 
As for how to decide whether a preference statement retums tme at a particular 
state in the program, the efficient pattern matching techniques (4.2, 4.5) play a key 
role again. Since a conditional or DecisionMaker statement is cornprised of a pair of 
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Figure 4.21: State Ranking for MoE Resulting from Option Pnontizing 
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Figure 4.22: State Ranking for Uniroyal Resulting from Option Pnontizing 
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non-conditional statements plus the connective, its truth value can be easily decided 
hased on the conditional or DecisionMaker truth table, once the truth values of its 
component unconditional statements are re tmed.  The problem is, therefore, to 
focus on how to calculate the truth value of an unconditional statement a t  a state. 
As pointed out earlier, an unconditional preference statement is no different from 
direct specification statements introduced in Section 4.3.2.4. As discussed in Section 
4.3.2.4: such a statement corresponds to one or more patterns which represent d l  
the states at  which the statement is true. GMCR II automatically transfomu a 
staternent into its corresponding patterns, and then uses pattern-matching (4.2, 
4.5) to determine whether a statement is true for a state. 
L'sing sufficiently complex preference statements, any ordering of the states can 
be represented by Option Prioritizing. However, some rankings may require many 
statements - the maximum is one per state. Nevertheless, Option Prioritizing is 
especially useful for large models, where the DMs' preferences t-ypically fa11 into 
regilar and consistent patterns. 
4.5.4 Direct Ranking 
The Direct Ranking or Fine Tuning in GMCR II ailows on-screen manipulation to 
refine the ranking list for a given decision maker. By invoking one of the radio 
boses in the upper-right of the dialog box in Figure 4.18, the user can perform the 
follonring operations: 
Move Group Moves a group of equally preferred states, including a single-state 
group, from one location in the ranking to another, by dragging the group to 
the desirable location. 
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Move State within Group To move a state within an equady preferred group 
from one location to another (within the same group). This operation is useN 
when combined with Splitting. 
Split To split an equally preferred group into two groups. In this mode, when the 
mouse is on the boundaries within the group, the cursor changes to a scissors 
shape, and a left-click splits the group into two, which are distinguished by 
different background colon. The cursor resumes to default aftenmrd. 
Join To highlight a range of contiguous states to create an extra equaliy preferred 
group, which ovemdes the initial groups within the range. 
Tliese four basic operations enable the user to achieve any desired ranking via 
on-screen direct manipulation. It is worth pointing out that these four user-fitendly 
ftrnctionalities involve a tremendous amount of implernentation effort. The exis- 
tchnce of indistznguishable states further justifies the necessity of direct rankhg. For 
txample, Option Weighting (4.14 can only be performed on a "representative" state 
of the coalesced group, resulting in a somewhst arbitrary location of the indistin- 
giiishable states. Direct Ranking is thus necessary to adjust the ranking of the 
iiidist inguishable states. 
In this section, a novel and flexible methodology for conveniently eliciting a domain 
expert's ordinal preference rauking is presented. This methodology is valuable in 
the modeling of strategic confïicts, when the user's assesmient of the preferences 
of each DM over all states is generally required. The methodology is cornpriseci 
of three techniques: Option Weighting, Option Priontizing, and Direct Ranking. 
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Option Weighting and Option Priorithhg c m  be utilized for moderate and large- 
size models (many dinerent States to be ranked). Direct Ranking can be used for 
small models or for fine tuning the prelirninary ranking obtained from either option 
weighting or option prioritizing. 
4.6 Graph-Based Modeling 
In some situations, decision makers may prefer to enter a model by directly spec- 
ifying the states, and the possible rnovements among them, based upon their own 
perceptions of the dispute. For instance, high-level executives or policy makers 
ofteri like to think directly about possible states in free fom, and about how more 
~wferred outcornes can be achieved, mithout worrying about the details of each 
state's clefinition. Sprague and McNurlin [84] point out that direct manipulation 
interface (DM) is most suitable for ElSs (Executive Information Systems) - DSSs 
For ~secutives. According to [84], in an EIS: only highly summaq performance 
data are accessed; graphin should be used to display and risualize the data; only 
ii minimum amount of analysis for modeling is required beyond the capabili- to 
"drill down" in summary data to examine components. Graph-based modeling of 
states may be very helpful in these cases, especiaily for smaller conflicts at early 
stages of development, and when the modeling is carried out in a "brain-storming7 
session. The Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution, mhich takes states as basic 
building blocks, makes graph-based modeling possible. 
Graph-based modeling permits a user to conveniently input a codîct  model by 
draning graphs directly on the screen, and to visually interpret the output. Each 
component (vertex or arc) of a graph wodd respond to the user's command, via 
a pointing device (usudy a mouse, or maybe a touch-screen interface). Highly 
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siirnrnarized models, that may be appropriate for higher-level executives or pol- 
iry makers, are usually smaller. Graph-based modeling is not intended for large 
inoclels, not only because the graphs would be difficult to display, but also because 
owr-ambitious modeling could make the model's behavior inexplicable and mould 
imnvhelm rat her than help the user. 
An annotated bibliography by [18] gives a comprehensive reviem of algonthw 
for graph drawing. To produce aestheticdy pleasing drawings of graphs is actually 
ii difficult task (181. -4 graph-drawing software development tool is needed for this 
kcy component of graph-based modeling. The desired development tools can be 
iit the form of either a gaph drawing tool that has an import/export interface, 
or a graph drawing development toolbox or library. For flexibility, the latter is 
preferable. Sander [SOI summarized the commercial and non-commercial graph- 
(lrawing tools and libraries currentlp available. In fact, most graph drawing tools 
target non-Windows platforms, and many are for special purposes such as displaying 
(.otit rol flow' visualizing program structures, etc. Moreover, the existing tool designs 
t l i ~  iiodes and arcs as components that can interact with the user. Therefore, a 
siicr~ssful implementation of the graph-based modeling in GMCR II is subject to 
t l i r  at-ailability of fieuible and general-purpose graph <Iritwing developrnent toob for 
;i \\'iudows platform. Nonetheless, some basic design ideas can be discussed nom, 
which may be helphil for future developments. 
Representation of states and state transitions in graph-based modeling can 
be done in a straight-formard manner. Clicking on the client area should 
cause a srnall ckcle to appear as a representation of a state (node). Dragging 
between a pair of states should create a h e  or curve comecting the states 
nith an arrow pointhg from the initial state to the target state, representing 
a directional state transition. A second arrow with the reverse direction can 
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be added if desired. IR this way, a graph model can be built for a focal DM. 
The chosen graph-drawing tool should be capable of updating the Iayout of 
the graph to keep it tidy whenever new components are added. GMCR II 
requires structural information - states and transitions - in order to build 
an interna1 analytical model for the analysis stage. A hit-test [72] function 
is required such that each node and arc can be treated as a control that can 
interact with the user. For example, a user can click on a node to enter a label 
for the node, or to invoke an popup window at any time to enter or review 
a brief description of the scenario represented by that node. The description 
iriity or ma? not be in terms of DMfoption format. Graphs for different 
Dl I s  (such as Figure 2.1 (a) (b) (c) ) c m  be drawn in separate windows. 
An integated graph (like Figure 2.1 (d)) can be generated, where moves 
by different DMs are disthguished by different arc colors. In an integrated 
graph, which puts al1 the structural information of a model in same screen, 
normally there is only one arc connecting a pair of nodes. The only exception 
is a cornmon move, in which case parallel arcs with different colors could 
I>e used. It should be the graph drawing tool's responsibility to coordinate 
layout between the integrated graph and the individual graphs such that the 
locations of the nodes and relevant arcs rernain unchanged when the view is 
snitched between two graphs. 
States and transitions are actually input while graphs are being dram. This 
graphical information is then converted by GMCR II into a format which can 
be processed by the andysis engine. It should be pointed out that graph- 
based modeling can better exploit the flexibüity of graph model. In option 
form modeling, even though the irreversibility specification provides a fair 
amount of flexibility in expressing state transitions, the feasible states and 
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state transitions are determined before the structural mode1 is built. In con- 
trast, graph-based rnodeling supports a t d y  interactive modeling procedure. 
The user may identify new states not previously envisioned while contemplat- 
ing the possible moves from an existing date. Likewise, when a new node 
(state) is added, he or she may discover moves not thought of until the graph 
is presented. This 'kodeling-whiledrawi,ng approach could be very effective 
and helpful in a "brain-storming" setting. 
Sometimes, ahile carrying out graph-based modeling, the user may find that 
one state has become irrelevant, or that several scenarios are effectively in- 
clistinguishable. Thus state removal and state coalescing are required. In the 
graph-draming interface, node deletion or node merging can be used. These 
c m  be done by combining the hit-test feature with a toolbar function, a short- 
[:ut! or a context menu. For node merging, a multiple highlighting function is 
;ils0 needed. When a node deletion or node merging is carried out, the arcs 
incident on the node should be processed accordingiy. The job of updating 
tlie layout to maintain an aesthetically pleasing appearance should be under- 
taken by the graph drawing tool. GMCR II can update its intemal structural 
rnod~l to retlect the changes. 
Kilgour et al. [52] and Fang et al. (201 present a general preference struc- 
ture for the Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution, explaining how the Graph 
Mode1 for Conflict Resolution c m  handle transitive or intransitive preferences. 
Howewr, the transitivity assumption can save a user a considerable amount 
of effort in s p e c m g  the preferences, and therefore is recommended for prac- 
ticd use. -1 graph-based preference specification method is proposed here for 
the graph-based modeling. The user can specify a focal DM'S preference or 
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indifference over two states by assigning a directed or undirected arc between 
the nodes for the two states, which will be retained by the system. With the 
t rami t ivity assump t ion, users do not need t O specify preferences over each 
pair of states. Actually, the most efficient preference ordering over C< states 
requires only p - 1 edge assignments. This method can prevent the assign- 
ment of a pair-wise preference contradicting the previous preference input in 
the sense of transitivity. It can also remind the user when the preference arc 
assignments are sufficient for the ranking. Figure 4.23 shows the flowchart for 
tliis graph-based preference specification method. For each node Ur E U, the 
system keeps track of two lists, L(uk) and E (ur), which contain the states that 
lia\-e been judged to be les  preferred or equaily preferred to uk, respectiveiy 
A s  can be seen from Figure 4.23, nodes marked earlier are more preferred. X 
preview window nill be useful to enable the user to look at his or her prefer- 
cnce specifications. One nray is to show the graph with each node labeled by 
the focal DM'S preference level. Another approach is to present al1 the UIs 
for the focal DBI on the graph. The user should dso be allowed to cancel or 
modify some pair-nise cornparison judgements. 
-4 grapbbased model can be connected to the analysis engine and then dis- 
playci again for interpretation of the analysis results. It is certainly much 
more powerful for interpretation purposes, especially for status quo analysis 
and visualkation of the stability analysis on a state of interest. Most ex- 
isting graph drawing tools [80] take the data equivalent to the reachability 
information as input and generate a graph layout based on the information. 
Consequently, another option is to export the reachability result from an 
option-forrn model, which is already state-based, to a suitable graph-drawing 
tool to draw the desired graph. 
contradiction - 
N N - + 
Accept u>u ' Accept u=u' 
L t u ~ : = U u u U u ' k E l u D )  E~u~=Uu' ) :=E(uk&lu '1 
Uu)=Uu'):=UuhrUu'J 
4 
Mark members of 
Cuw~:=Cuwu+l E(u)l 1 
Figure 4.23: Graph-Based Preference Specincation 
Chapter 5 
Analysis of Strategic Conflict s 
A conflict model constnicted via procedures described in Chapter 4, is a basic 
frarnework within which strate& interactions among the DMs can be analyzed in 
rlrtail. The analysis engine of GMCR II can calculate the stability of every state 
from each DM'S viewpoint. This in tuni permits the straightfonvard calculation of 
tlie set of equilibria, consisting of the States that are stable for each DM. 
The results of the stability andysis c m  then be interpreted by the user in order 
to iinderstand better the real-world conflict. To facilitate the interpretation and 
rcfiriernent of the stability analysis, various foilom-up analyses can then be camed 
otit. 
5.1 S t ability Analysis 
The stability analysis of a conflict is camed out by determining the stability of 
each state for every DM. A state is stable for a DM if and only if that DM has no 
incentive to deviate fkom it unilaterally, under a particular behavior model? usually 
referred to as a stability definition or solution concept. A state is an epuiiihium or 
possible resolution under a particular stabiiity definition iff all DMs fuid it stable 
under that stability definition. A broad range of stability definitions (Table 2.1, 
Section 2.2.3) are implemented in GMCR II, representing diverse human decision 
niaking characteristics. For example, stability definitions embody several different 
attitudes to strategic risk, as well as many levels of foresight. This range of sta- 
Idity clefinitions gives the analyçt a clear picture of how the conflict can evolve, 
;iiicl how the DMs' decision styles and approaches are reflected in the evolution. 
Tliiis. the analyst's judgement and experience can be integrated into the modeling, 
iiiterpretation? and prediction process. 
5.1.1 GMCR I as Analysis Engine 
G31CR 1 r20. Appendices] was the 6rst computer program to carry out stability 
miilysis under the paradigm of the Graph Mode1 for Conflict Resolution. It was 
written in the C language and nins under the DOS operating system. Using DOS'S 
I/O rrclirection. GMCR 1's input and output are ASCII text files. The input tes* 
 fil^ rrqiiires information about 
the number of DMs involved in the conflict model; 
the number of states in the model; 
reachable list of each state for each decision rnaker, and 
ordinal payoff for each state for each decision rnaker. 
The output file contains: 
a s u m m q  of equilibria for each of the stabiliw types listed in Table 2.1; 
the stability of each state, under each stabiiity type, for each DM. 
In both input and output files, a state or a DM is identified by number. Since 
GJICR I takes an available conflict mode1 as given, and does not have an interac- 
tive user interface, it has serious limitations on both the front and the back ends. 
However, the analysis part of GMCR 1 is quite powerhil. It efficiently carries out 
au eshaustive stability analysis for a wide range of solution concepts. For this 
rmson, GhICR 1 and its improved versions was used as an interim analysis engine 
For the earlier versions of GMCR II, until GMCR II's own analysis engine was de- 
wloped iising object-oriented design and progamming. The rnodeling information 
rstaldishecl via the input interface of GMCR II is converted into a GMCR 1 input 
filr siich that GSICR 1 can take over stability analysis. The use of GhICR I as 
a11 interirn analysis engine contributed greatly to the development of GMCR II, 
(qwcially because it allowed the modeling subsystem and analysis subqstem to 
lw implemented separately, and hence minimized the coupling between these two 
cliscrct e su bsystems (Section 3.2), which is considered good software design practice 
kir hotli stnictured design and object-oriented design [go]. 
The GlICR II analysis engine n.as developed by improving and expanding, the 
original GMCR I program. While GMCR 1's analysis is powerful in that a tarietg of 
sta bility definitions are incorporated, its capacity to handle larger models is limited. 
Wien more than two DMs are involved, GMCR 1 required [20, Appendices] that 
the rnxsllnurn number of states be 100, and maximum number of DMs be 5. Of 
course: state number is not the only index that reflects the amount of memory that 
GMCR 1 requires - the length of reachable lists matters too. SometMes, therefore, 
the program fails before reading these limits. 
.-\ main reason for size limitations in GMCR I is that not enough attention 
tws paid to memory management, even though linked lists rather than a multi- 
dimensional array were used to represent allowable transitions [20, Chapter 21. 
But in fact, very few human users would be willing tu prepare rnanually a mode1 
[vit h 100 states and 5 DbIs anyway. Imagine 500 reachable lists and 5 preference 
ritiikings over 100 states without an interactive input interface! But when sening 
iis iin analysis engine in GMCR II, the situation for GMCR 1 is different. 
Iniprovements that were made to GMCR 1 in terms of memory management 
iiirliicle the folloning: 
Highly inefficient fised-size multi-dimensional arrays used to represent the 
stability results were removed. Instead, a state's stability under one solution 
concept is simply recorded in one bit - a 1-bit indicates stable and a O-bit 
iinstable. A DOCiBLEWORD is used to record a state's stability under the 
stability definitions of R. GMR, SMR, SEQ, NM and up to 10 levels of limited- 
move stability. In total 14 bits (LI overlaps with R) nTere used, with 18 bits 
reserved for future introduction of new solution concepts. Bit-wise operations 
are used to make the recording and retrieval of the stabilities simple and fast. 
Large numbers of redundant intermediate variables were replaced by a very 
small nurnber of essential variables. 
Variables that previously occupied the stack and Fiequently caused stack- 
o~~erflow ere replaced by pointers, with memory dynamicdy allocated to 
heap. 
GMCR 1 was ported to Windows 3.1, on which global memory ailocations 
can be used under protected mode [72] via rather complicated (and unstable) 
processes. Fortunately, in Windows 95% 32-bit memory addressing capacity 
and virtual memory management [73] eventually make this relatively hassle- 
free. (A Windows 95 version of GMCR II was started in late 1997.) Nonethe- 
Iess, the previous memory-saving measures remain vaiid and wort hwhile. 
GNCR 1 and its improved versions have now been replaced by an 0-0 program 
(I~wlopecl using Visual C++/MFC. However, useful algorithms and techniques 
tisetl in the improvement greatly contributed to the development and testing of the 
mrrcnt version. 
5.1.2 nlustrative Implementatzon for Stabzlzty Analyszs 
As c m  be seen from Section 2.2.3, the stability analysis for any of the stabil- 
i ty rlefinit ions is basically a systernatic examination of the perrnissible mores and 
(-nti11termot.e~ by the Dlls  during possible evolution of the conflict. The basic com- 
potlents that underlie these stability definitions are individual unilateral moves, 
groiip unilateral moves and anticipation. The group unilateral move is taken as 
ilil esample belon? to iilustrate the implementation, because t his concept is also 
essential to coalition analysis and status quo analysis which ni11 be discussed iater 
i ~ i  t liis chapter. 
The g o u p  reachable list for H C N from state u, SH(u), is defined recursively 
in Definition 2.1. 
The original implementation in GMCR I uses a iinked Iist, as s h o m  ia Figure 
3.1. to represent SH (u)  [20]. In Figure 5.1, -(ut) = j if nH, (ut) = { j }  and 
A*H,,(d) = O if In,(ut)l > 1. Note that a state u is alnrays identified by its index 
in the implementation. The GMCR 1 algorithm is transcribed in pseudocode as 
listed in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.1: A Three Element Ce11 in the Linked List 
This complicated algonthm simply adds to the link list al1 states that can result 
from any sequence of Uhls by some or al1 members of the group H. But a large 
a riioiint of effort is devoted to ensuring 
that the same state is not added twice, and 
that states resulting from tmo consecutive rnoves by the same DhI are not 
included. 
For tliese latter purposes, a large amount of searching and cornparhg is required. 
niid making the use of the linked list collection shape somewhat awhard.  For 
~sa rnp le~  the simple condition if u" SH(u) in the above algorithm adds con- 
siclerable complexity, because the entire list must be searched to ensure that this 
condition holds. The program becomes very inefficient as the list builds up. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the characteristics of the three commonly avaiiable collec- 
tion shapes: list, array, and map. Comparing them on d three applicable features 
listed on the nght of the table, one can fhd that the map collection shape is the 
niost suitable for storing goup UMs. 
A map is a dictionary-based collection with hash table implementation [l], which 
maps unique keys to values. It only takes constant t h e ,  on the average, to insert, 
delete or retriew a key-value pair (element) into the map. Iteration over all the 
for j E H  
.. .for ut E Sj(u) 
...... if ut4SH(u) then 
.ut E SH(u); ........ 
. w u ( u t )  = j ;  ........ 
...... e l s e  
. W ~ ~ ( U ' )  = O ;  ........ 
...... endif 
... endf or 
endf or 
f lag  = 1; 
vhile ( f lag == 1) 
... flag = 0 ;  
.. .for ut f SH(u)  
...... for  j E H  
......... for u" f S (ut)  
............ if m u ( u t )  # O then 
............... if j # a u ( u t )  then 
. i f  ut' 4 SH(u) then ................. 
U " E  SH(u);  ..................... 
. u ~ , , ( u ~ ~ )  = j ;  .................... 
.....................flag=t; 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . e l s e  
.................... . i f  (wHu(utt) # O )  then 
. . i f  ( j  T WEI,(^^')) then ...................... 
U&(ut') = O ;  ........................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f l a g =  1; 
................. . . . . . . . e n d i f  




..if ut' 4 SH(U)  then ............. 
.ut' € SH(u) ;  ................. 
.wu(ut t )  = j ;  ................. 
.................. f1ag=1; 
............... else 
....,..-.....,... .if ( u ~ ~ ( u ' ~ )  # O )  then 
..................... if ( j  # W H ~ ( U ' ~ ) )  then 








endf or ... 
enduhile. 
Figure 5.2: Onginal Algorithm for SH(u) 
Table 5.1: Collection Shape Features 
I Insert an Search for Duplicate 
S hape Ordered? Indexed? element specified elements? l 
a 1 Yes By int Slow Slow Yes 
List 
\lap / 90 By key Fast Fast No ((keys) 
element 
Yes No Fast SIow Ys 
I Yes (values) 
rleitients in the rnap is also allowed. In GMCR II's new analysis engine: a map class 
is Imilt which takm the target state of a move (must be unique) as key, and the 
DM 11-ho controls the move (not necessary unique) as value. A SetAt(ke9, value) 
opwation of this class first look up the key (fast. see Table 5.1). If the key is 
foiiiicl. then the corresponding d u e  is changed; othenvise a new key-value pair is 
rreatccl. With al1 the suitable features of this new data structure, the algorithm is 
gr~at ly  strearnlined, as can be seen from Figure 5.3. 
The set of group ULIS SH(u) is a important concept used not only in the im- 
plriiit~iit at iou of a series of st abilitr d e h i  tions, but also in the coalition analyis 
iiiid the status quo analysis to be introduced later this chapter. When used for 
sta bility analysis purposes, the above algorithm c m  actually be furt her optimized. 
For esample, in calculating GMR stability, before u' or u" is added to the map, 
it can be checked whether whether the move to it is an effective sanction to the 
original UI. If yes, the loop c m  be broken, and the map does not grom further. 
This improved algorithm for group UI, the efficient calculation of reachable lists 
(Swtion 4.4.3): and more efficient implementation of stability definitions, enable 
for j E H  
.. .for U' E Sj(u) 
...... SH(u).Set-At(& j) ; 
. . , endfor 
endf or 
vhile ( l S ~ ( u ) l  # c) 
.. .for u' E Sw(u) 
for j E H  ...... 
........ .for U" E Sj(u') 
SH(u) .SetaAt (u", j) ; ............ 
........ .endfor 
..... .endfor 
... endf or 
.. .C = I ~ H ( u ) ~ ;  
endwhile. 
Figure 5.3: Improved Algorithm for SH(u) 
G K R  II to carry out stability analysis effectively and efficiently. The biggest 
rd-world conflict model that has been documented is the Trade-in-Sen-ices model 
Iiipe90bl Iiipe94 111th 184,320 feasible states, which was analyzed by Decisionhlaker. 
CXCR II successfully anaked  the model and produced a stability result identi- 
i-iil to the DecisionlIaker results on Nash and SEQ (the only stability types tthat 
Dwision.\Iaker can handle). The performance of CbICR II is obviously superior to 
Derisionl laker, 
GNCR II's anaipis engine implements a range of stability definitions, each repre- 
sent ing a particular pattern of behavior, including foresight , attitude tonrard risk, 
etc.. as characterized in Table 2.1. Therefore, which stability definition(s) is suitable 
for n certain DM depends on the characteristics or behavior patterns of that DM. 
Consequently, it is quite possible that DMs involveci in a conflict wiii have different 
1)rliavior patterns, and thus that different stability definitions be required. 
It is cornmonly received that a state is an equiiibrium if it is stable for al1 
the DlIs in the model. However, it has so far been interpreted as: a state is an 
cqiiilibrium undez a particular stability definition if it is stable for al1 DMs under 
t hat particular stability definition. This interpretation implies that the DMs in 
ronflict share the same behavior pattern, which is neither good nor necessary. 
In the current applications of graph model for conflict resolution, equilibrium 
typs  are the same as stability types. For example, a state said to be SEQ equi- 
lihriiitn is SEQ stable for al1 DSIs. A much richer variety of equilibrium types c m  
; m l  sliould he defined by allowing different DMs to use different stability types in 
c i l i r i u m  For example, an equilibriurn state could be SEQ stable for one Dhl, 
X I I  stable for another, etc.. To incorporate these new equilibrium types is not 
diffiçitlt, since the stability analyses remain the same. This requires only a naming 
iiiid specification mechanisrn, which mil1 be discussed further in next chapter. 
The question that would affect the stability analysis, esp. its workload is: now 
r l i a t  only a few solution concepts can possibly apply to a DM, can those be specified 
Iwfore the running of the onalysis engine so that the non-applicable stability types 
ciin he left out in the £kt place? The answer is positive. Howevert except for 
huge rnodels, the e-xhaustive analysis in GMCR II over the stability types c m  be 
clone \-eV fast in any case. Therefore the approach currently adopted is to do the 
rsliaustive analysis first, and then the user can choose to display the applicable 
ones (Section 6.3). 
5.2 Coalition Analysis 
Coalition formation constitutes a comrnon sociological phenornenon in strategic 
conflicts involving more than two DMs, especially in group decision and negoti- 
ation situations. Coalition analysis is a methodology that tries to predict which 
coalitions are likely to form, and which coalitions would benefit or harm a certain 
D'II. hy stiidying the impact of the coalition on the outcorne. The main objec- 
t i w  of this section is to present a new perspective on coalition analysis, one that 
ii<l<ls an important dimension to the methodology of the Graph Mode1 for Conflict 
R~soliition as well as the decision support system GMCR II. 
A coalition is a subset of two or more DMs who coordinate their actions in 
sotiic aay The wrious approaches to coalition analysis constitute models of joint 
:ict ion by a coalition, usually leading tu conclusions about how coalitions change the 
sr rticture of a strategic conflict. Understanding the effect of coalitions is important, 
its i:oaiitions have been observed frequently in military, political, economic, legd. 
viirironrnental, and other disputes involving three or more DMs. Some coalitions 
swm to be extremely durable; others form and then dissolve, or fail to become 
oprrational due to inability to agree an joint actions. Finally, the threat of a 
coalition can be of strategic importance, even if the coalition itself never forms. 
5.2.1 Prevzous Wodi 
Early work on coalition analysis applicable to the ordinal approach to modeling 
preferences includes that of Brams [12] mho argued that coalitions form in order 
to %in", that is, the existence of coalitions reflect strategic possibilities. .4now1s 
famous Impossibiiity Theorem [4] shows that, working ordinally, it is difficult in 
general to define the preferences of a coalition. Some insighthil discussions on 
coalitions in complex decision situations c m  be h d  in [74, Ch.41. 
Wit hin the framework of conflict resolution methodologies, coalition analysis has 
t m n  carried out from two perspectives. Kuhn et al. [63] proposed a state-based 
rnetric, measuring the similarity of preferences among the members of a proposed 
rorlition as an indicator of the likelihood of the forming of this coalition. Meister 
ct (il. [66] and Hipel and Meister [40] proposed an option-based metric related 
to t lie preference tree [2'7], which depends on the "similarity of preference" for 
i I I <  li\-klrial options and the "average importancen of individual options for coalition 
rriernbers. An overall coalition preference tree, which contains the coalition's ordinal 
pr~fwences owr the states, is then built up from the individual preference trees and 
t his option-based metric. 
The first of these perspectives is based on the assumption that DMs with more 
similar preferences are more likely to form a coalition. The second is a necessary 
strp to redefining a codlict mode1 with the coalition as a new player - the coalition's 
pr~fcreuces must be determined in some way. However, Brams [12] proceeds froni 
tlir assumption that a DM searches not for a coalition partner mho has similar 
prrferences, but who provides that DM with a greater chance of doing better. The 
stiicly of the Elrnira Groundwater Contamination ~ i s b u t e ,  the mode1 of which is 
lisecl in this thesis, reveals clearly that preference similarity is not necessary for 
tlie members of a coalition to achieve a mu tudy  preferable equilibriurn. Moreover, 
treating a coalition as a single DM actually implies that the coalition has to  be 
cltirable throughout the course of the confiict and the control of the members' 
options is absolutely centralized. The author believe that the world of strategic 
confiicts is far more versatile for t his assumption to hold. Thus the new perspective 
oii coalition analysis implemented here is based on the impact of the coalition on 
the oiitcome, instead of on similarity of preferences. 
5.2.2 A New Perspective 
The objective here is to provide a nenr perspective on the study of coalition for- 
mation using the gaph  model framework (or some other related conflict models), 
and to illustrate this new prospective using the Elmira case. Some definitions are 
prrsented, which lead to measures of tendency of certain coalitions to form, and the 
rrsiilting tendency of certain outcornes to be unstable. By studying the possible 
impact of coalitions on stability results in a conflict involving more than two DMs, 
oiic cean get a clearer picture of the decision situation. 
-4 coalition is any subset H C N such that (HI 2 2. (Thus a coalition is any 
set of two or more DMs). SH(u) (Definition 2.1) was defined to model sanctions 
iii the stability a n a s i s  of a multiple-DM model [20]. It Nil1 continue to be used 
in tliis coalition analysis context without alteration. The only difference is that a 
iiieniber of SH(u) is now called a coalition moue by H from state u. 
Definition 5.1 A state u E U zs stable for coalition H 28 
Vu' E SH(u), 3i E H so thot P,(uf) 5 Pi(u). 
Definition 5.2 A state u' E U is called a coalition improvement h m  state u 
by H C N if it LP a member of 
Sote that the set of coalition improvements by H, S H ) ( ~ )  is different b r n  
S& ( u )  (Section 2.2.2), mhich is the set of ail group Uls by H. The latter requires 
tliat each member c m  be reached via a sequence of inividual UIs, but the member 
itself does not necessary make every coalition member better off. In contrast, the 
first lias no requirernent on the individual moves that form each of its rnembers, 
Imt. does required that each mernber must be an improvement for each coalition 
rnember. O bviously, 
Proposition 5.1 A state u' E U is stable for coalition H ifl 
Proposition 5.1 means that a state is stable for a coalition if and on- if that 
roalit ion does not have available improvement from this state. 
Definition 5.3 A state u E U as coalitionally stable i '  it as stable for al1 coali- 
tions H C N. 
.loinhg Definition 5.3 and Proposition 5.1 gives 
Proposition 5.2 A date u E U is coalitionally stable iJVH C N: SHI = 0.. 
Of particular interest are states that are stable for al1 Dbls (according to some 
iucli\idual stability definitions) but are unstable for some coaütion (s) . These states 
are Iikely to persist as long as the DMs act independently, but are unlikely to endure 
if a coalition forms for mhich they are not coalitionally stable. The contribution of 
coalition analysis is to point out these states that are vulnerable to coalitions. This 
is particularly the case when, as in the Elmira codhct, the coalition improvement 
is itself highly stable - both individually and coalitionally. 
(5.6) 
Figure 5.4: Relevant Part of Integrated Graph for Elmira Moclel 
Figure 5.4 shows the relevant part of the integrated gaph  of the Elmira conflict, 
ivhere the ordinal payoffs of MoE and Uniroyal are labeled beside each node. (The 
fiwt ancl second numbers in brackets denote SIoE's and Uniroyal's ordinal payoffs, 
rmpectively. Recdl that a greater payoff means more preferred.) Use index values 
1. '2. 3 to represent the three DMs, MoE, Uniroyal and Local Government (LG). 
respecti~el. Let H ={1, 2). Ive have us é SII(u5), PL (u8) > Pl (us),  &(u~) > 
P2(ni) .  In other words. MoE and Uniroyal together control the transition from 
staw 5 to 8, and that both are better off at state 8 than at state 5. Therefore. 
state 3 is not stable for coalition H; it is coaiitionaily unstable, even though it 
is strongly stable under individual stability definitions (Table 2.6. Furthemore, 
tlir cousequence of the coalition improvement, state 8, is highly stable individually 
(Table 2.6) and coaütionally stable also. Figure 5.4 shows how the coalition move 
frorn 5 to 8 could take place. 
This analysis of the Elmira model is supported by actual events. Historicaliy, 
the status quo in mid-1991 was state 1. Local Government shifted quickly to 
support the original Control Order, resulting in state 5 for a protracted interval of 
tinie. Tlien bIoE and Uniroyal dramaticdy announced agreement on a modified 
wrsion of the original control order, thus moving to the equilibrium at state 8. This 
agreement caught Local Government by surprise; its protests were to no avail, and 
it \\.ils forced to reach a separate and quite unfavorable arrangement with Uniroyal. 
Tlie coalition made both MoE and Uniroyd better off, and the outcome was no 
Iess stable than before. Local Govemment !vas harmed by the deal, but could do 
tiotliing to prevent it. Here, an interesting observation is that the sirnilarity of 
prrferences between MoE and Uniroyd is actualiy lower than that of any other 
ilair. yet {lloE. Cniroyal} is the coalition that aas formed. bloreover, both state 5 
;iiid state 8 are coalitionally stable for any coalition other than {410Eo Uniroyal}. 
.A coalition improvement by a subset of DMs indicates a threat to the stability of 
;i state. Even though the coalition might find it difficult to co-operate to implement 
tlic iinprovement, the important fact, identified here, is that the coalition members 
liave an incentive to co-operate. This information can form the basis for valuable 
;idvice to DlIs in a conflict. This nrork is quite different from others n-ho require 
t l i ~  coalition's preference ranking in order to treat it as a single "DM". The l ier  
t i i k ~ ~ i  here is that an individual cooperates when it is in that individual's interest to 
iwoperate. Other approaches begin by speci&ing the coalition, and then calculating 
lion. it affects behavior; here, a state is defined to be coalitiondy stable only rhen 
tliere is no coalition that is capable of upsetting it, and actually prefers to do so. 
Coalition stability for a coalition is related to Pareto Inferiorïty. 
Definition 5.4 A state u E U is said to be Pareto-Merior for a coalition H 
rrithin S C U if  3uf E S  SUC^ that V i  E H ,  Pi(uf) > Pi(u) and 3j  E H ,  Pj(uf) > 
It can be proven: 
Proposition 5.3 I f u  E U is Pareto-znferior for H wi 
tionally unstable. 
thzn SH(u), then u is coa 
This the significance of this proposition is, under the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution paradigm, group Pareto-inferior outcomes can probably be removed via 
proper communication and cooperation. This is useful when using the Graph Model 
for Conflict ~ e s o l u t  ion in oegotiation and bargaining. 
5.2.3 Implementatzon in GMCR II 
Ciirrently the intended role of coalition analysis in GMCR II is as a Follow-up 
iiiiiil~~es that re-examines the states that have been identified as equilibria by the 
st ability analysis, according to certain individual stability specifications. The main 
pi trpose is to challenge the coalitional stability of these equilibrium states, and 
possibly reduce the number of possible outcomes by identifying those that are 
(.oditionally unstable. .b a first implementation step, GMCR II mil1 point out 
tlir rqidibria chat Lire vulnerable to a coalition imprcivement that leads to otlier 
qiiilibria. This kind of coalition improvments is also referred to as 'équilibrium 
jumping" ([6l]). 
From the series of dennitions and discussions in Section 5.2.2, it c m  be seen 
t hat the concept of SR(u) is instrumental to this new coalition anabsis approach. 
Therefore, the efncient implementation of Sa(u) in Section 5.1.2 geatly facilitates 
t lie implementation of the cdculation of coalition stability 
Let the set of equilibria fkom stability andysis of GMCR II be E,  and denote 
the set of DMs who prefer equilibrium et over e by N(e,e'). The algorithm for 
for e E &  
... for e t € &  
...... N(e, et) = 0 ;  
for i E N  ...... 
......... if (Pj(ef) > P,(e)) 
. i ~  N(e,et);  ........... 
....... ..endif 
...... endfor 
...... if (e' G~(e,t?)(e) 
mark e as coalitionally unstable; ......... 
......... break; 
..endif .... 
... endf or 
endf or. 
Figure 5.5: Algorithm for Identifying Coaltionally "Vulnerablen Equilibriurn 
itlentifying the "vulnerable equilibria" according to the above discussion can be 
r*spressed as pseudo code in Figure 5.5. 
Of course. the above algorithm can be easily extended, if desired, by replacing E 
n-itli full state set U. This identification process provides the user a better picture 
of preclicted resolutions of a con£lictct? and hence helps achieve better decisions. 
5.2.4 Possible Extensions 
Tliere are two directions in mhich this work on coalition analysis could be extended. 
One is to consider counterrnoves to the coalition improvement; the other is to take 
into account the enforcability of the agreement that the coalition improvement is 
based upon. 
What has been dehed earlier in this chapter is a sort of "Lin ("Nash") stabil- 
ity for coalitions: no counter-moves are considered. When they are included, other 
stability types can also be defined, although they may be applicable only under 
coinples assumptions about behavior. For instance, Bernheim, Peleg and W i n -  
ston 's [IO, 1 l] 'Coalition-proof Nash Equilibnum" against Aumann's "S trong Nash 
E~~iiilibrium" [5] is a good reference to start. The following is the author's first try: 
Definition 5.5 A state u E U is coalitionaily safe 8: VH N, i f  s ~ ) ( u )  # 
yl. then Vu' E s ~ ) ( u ) ,  3H' C H, svch that sa)(,') # 0. 
Acc:ording to this definition, the original stability (if applicable) of a state can 
oiily he challenged by a coalition improvement that itself is internally coalitionally 
stable. 
The "cooperativen tienpoint in game theory assumes DLIs can make an agree- 
nient that is binding and enforcable. But, as pointed out by Brams [13, page 
2.51. .*their ciecision to cooperate in the first place should emerge as the result of 
*iioii-cooperati~e' individual calculations, which would inform them, for esample, 
tliitt such an agreement is stable instead of their just assuming this to be the case..' 
Bi iilding cooperative game t heory on non-cooperative foundations is what is known 
i l s  t l i ~  "Sash program" in game theory. The DMs should plan their moves without 
~)rrsiiriiing t liat other DMs are bound by agreements to coopera te; ratlier, ot lier 
DMs ml1 cooperate only if they find it in their interests to do so. A coalition im- 
provernent can be viewed as an agreement among coalition members. So a coalition 
improvement has to seem to be stable or enforcuble. An agreement is enforcable if 
it is not in any coalition memberys interest to diverge fiom the agreement. For 
esample, in Figure 5.4, agreement "5 + 6 + 8" wouId be more "enforceable" 
tlian -t 7 + 8". .As a minimum condition, a coalition improvement is stable 
or enforceable because it makes the actual movers better off. But there could be 
different ways to define the enforceability of an agreement, depending on each coali- 
tion member's solution concept, as weU as  other assumptions. Additional study is 
rcquired to define enforceability credibly in different contexts. In other words, much 
niore content could be added to the definition of coalitional stability. 
Ir1 conclusion, the new concept of coalition stability mil1 contribute to the theory 
of miilti-party negotiations and help to increase the performance of the related 
DSSs. It ni11 rnake an important contribution to the effeetiveness of GMCR II in 
iiicling DMs in negotiation and other form of strategic conflict. 
5.3 Status Quo Analysis 
Stiittts quo refers to the current situation of the conflict. "Status quo analysis" m s  
occasionally used to refer to the identification of a path on which the conflict would 
iiiow from the status quo to the predicted outcorne. This kind of identification 
is often done in an ad hoc and intuitive manner; no systematic process has been 
siiggested. The role of status quo in the analysis and interpretation of a conflict 
lias Leen so far largely underestimated, or simply ignored. This section demon- 
sr iïites hotv stat us quo and its associated analysis can be used in the analysis and 
iiitcrpretation of a conflict model. 
5 -3.1 Status Quo Analysis and Iweversible Moues 
The importance of status quo analysis is highiighted due to the existence of i r r e  
wrsible moves in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. In general, status quo 
iiiial~sis concerns how far and mhere a conflict can reach £rom the status quo. In the 
the ssumption (4.8) of original option form, a confiict can move from any status 
qtio state to any other state via a joint effort of ail DMs: 
VU € EU, &(il) = U \ (u}. 
However, the introduction of irreversible rnoves greatly changes the landscape. For 
rase of reference, the integrated graph of the Elmira conlict and the table listing 
rach DM'S preference ranking are reproduced in Figure 5.6 and Table 5.2, respec- 
t,iw.t.Ly. From Figure 5.6, it can be seen that: 
Fsotn this above list, one can surely better appreciate mhat a big difference the 
concept of irreversible moves has brought to the nature of conflict modeling. 
5.3.2 Status Quo and StabiCty Analyszs 
Eqiiilibria as an output of the stability analysis are intended to be the predicted 
possible resolution of a conftict model. However, the status quo of the confiict model 
is currently not considered part of the input for stability analysis. The consequence 
is that some of the "predicted resolutions" would be simply impossible to reach fiom 
Figure 3.6: Integated Graph of the Elmira Model 
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ttic starting point of the model. Therefore, the status quo should become part of 
t lie input, and the necessary scope of stability snalysis can usually be significantly 
rduced. An extreme example is, in the Elmira model, if the status quo were state 
9: t hen no stability analysis mould be necessary - there is simply no way out! 
Performing stability analysis only in a restricted scope based on status quo, 
rat lier than on the mhole set, can mean a significant saving of computing resource. 
'\[ore important reason is that unreachable, and hence false, prediction should be 
ritlcd out. In the current version of GMCR II, exhaustive stability analysis is still 
p~rbrmed. but a well designed status quo analysis interface is provided to facilitate 
r l w  iiser's need. A conflict analysis without status quo analysis is an incomplete 
;iiidysis. 
5.3.3 Evolutzon Path of Confict Mode1 
.\ popiilar use of status quo analysis is to find the possible evolution path from 
t l w  tlie starting point of the conflict to an equilibrium. Status quo analysis as a 
follon*-iip analpis is usually camed out after the stability results are available. It 
sli«ii1cl be pointed out that an evolution path is not just a viable path in the inte- 
grat~d graph linking the status quo to the focal equilibrium: rather, the incentive 
o f  each DM to join the path based on his/her behavior style is important. For 
esample, a DSI should not be expected to move Erom a state that is stable for him 
or her. Conseqently, usualiy no evolution path can p a s  through an equilibrium 
state. However, one exception is the "equilibrium jumpn as discussed in Section 
5.2.3. GMCR II's coalition analysis takes into account uequilibrîum jumping". 
5.3.4 Beyond Evolvtion Path 
Stntus quo analysis can also be used to provide strategic advice directly. For ex- 
ample, in the Elmira mode1 (Figure 5.6), assume that the status quo is state 2 
aiid the D W  behavior patterns are al1 non-rnyopic. One c m  find that if Uniroyal 
niove first to state 4, then the only possible states the codict  can move to axe 
itirmbers of GN(u4) = {ug, up}. Notice that Uniroyal itself control the move to 
sta te 9. so the possible destinations now reduce to GN\p) (24) = {us} .  Since state 
S is ;m eqiiilibrium (Table 2.6) that is favorable to Uniroyal, a possible strategy for 
Ciiiroyl ~voulcl be, move quickly to state 4 so as to achieve a favorable equilibrium. 
St;itiis qtio analysis can also be used to verify the stability results of a state by 
vsiirriiiiiiig tlie possible moves and countermoves in sequence. Gnder careful study, 
intich more helpful forms of status quo analysis can be discovered. The g a p h  
iiiotlcl is especially suitable for status quo anaiysis, due to its state-based nature. 
Tlir implementation of various forms of status quo analysis basically concerns the 
cïi lnilat ion of Gi (u) , Gr (u) ,GH (u) ,G& (u) ,and G;) (u) . The efficient irnplernen- 
ti it ioi i  of tliese cornponents in GMCR II (as discussed in Sections 4.4.3 and 5.1.2) 
is c~ssent ial to t his feature. 
5.4 Other Follow-Up Analyses 
Follow-up analyses refer to additional 'khat if" analyses that may be carried out 
è i  ft ~r the initial stability analysis. Besides coalition analysis and st atus quo analysis, 
sensitiviw analysis, dynamic analysis and hypergame analysis are other foilom-up 
analyses that cm provide useful interpretations and refinements of the stability 
r~ssiilts. This section provides a brîef introduction to these techniques and their 
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implement in the current version of GMCR II. 
5.4.1 Sensitzvzt y Analyszs 
Tlie general purpose of sensitivity analysis is to  identify the most sensitive param- 
rters of a rnodel in terms of impact on the predictions of the rnodel. Information 
almit most real-world conflicts is generally incomplete, and estimates of the pa- 
rnnwters are Iikelp to be subjective - depending on the perceptions, opinions, and 
rsprience of the analyst. Therefore, sensitivity analysis is importance in conflict 
rcsol u t ion. 
Sensitivity analysis for the g a p h  mode1 is usually carried out by asking "what 
if 'r questions, or in other words, by varying the model input in the following 
c ë i  t egories: 
the identity of the DMs, and the options (or state transitions) available to 
t hem: 
the preferences of the D bIs; 
the beha\loral styles of the DMs. 
Becnitse conflict andysis is based on ordinal models, and because there is al- a 
certain amount of user interaction between the input and output stage, sensitivity 
analysis is carried out in the form of sençitivity testing, instead of the paramet- 
ric a n d p i s  used in quantitative methods. Nonetheles, it is helpful to develop a 
systematic procedure so that relevant aspects of the range of variation of input 
information can be suggested to  the andyst. 
In existing systems, sensitivity analyses can be carried out only in a separated 
session by rerunning the system. GMCR II is built as a multiple document interface 
(1 [DI) Windows application (721. MD1 applications allow multiple document frame 
ainclows to be open in the same instance of an application. An MD1 application 
lias a window nithin which multiple MD1 child windows, which are thernselves 
friirne Rindows, can be opened. Each child window contains a separate document, 
permitting GbICR II to carry out sensitivity analyses in the same session, but on 
different clocuments. In this n7ay, GMCR II offers more than existing systems. 
Because in GLICR II al1 the input information in modeling stage is saved in 
a .p ( g a p h  model) file, the reformulation effort for a slightly different model is 
iioiiiiiial. However, assessrnent of the results of the variations needs an alignment 
hi l i t \ ;  especially when the variation has changed the list of feasible states in the 
iiioclel. It is left to future deveiopment to design a genuine integration of sensitivity 
i 1 t i d ~ ~ k  feat ures into this system. 
Sormally~ sensitivity anaiysis is intended to assess the robustness of the stability 
r~sttlts. However, sensitivity anaiysis can also be used to provide strategic insights 
r o  tlie analyst. For exarnple, an interesting aspect of the Elmira confiict? from a 
policy point of tleienr, is the effort to ensure that Local Government had an essential 
role in de~eloping the resolution. Sensitivity analyses can be carried out to examine 
the importance of this role in the outcome of the codict. 
In the existing Elmira model, add one more "at least one" specification as 
Iiighiighted in Figure 5.7 (compare with Figure 4.6). The resulting nem rnodel has 
fil-P states (Figure 5.8, mith the status on option 4 (IRPiSt) fixed to "Y" ). Ail the 
otlier aspects of the rnodel remain the same. C d  this model the Elmira Y sub- 
iiioclel. A Elmira ?T sub-mode1 can be simüarly obtained, in which al1 the states 
lia\-e --S on option 5. The correspondence of states among the original model, the 
Figure 5.7: Model Variation for Sensitivity Analysis 
Y sub-mode1 and the N sub-mode1 is given in Table 5.3. 
Stability analyses are performed on these two sub-models and the results are 
listed in Table 5.4. Comparing Tables 5.4, 5.3 and 2.6, one can find that Local 
Goremment cannot possibly influence the result of the conflict. Therefore, decision 
advice for the Local Govenunent based on this sensitivity analyses is that it should 
either keep out to avoid the cost of involvement, or that it should consider other 
more effective strategies. 
Figure 5.8: Feasible States in Elmira Y Sub-Mode1 
Table 5.3: Feasible States of the Elmira Model, Y Sub-Model and N Sub-Mode1 
1. MoE 
(1) Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y -  
2. Uniroyal 
(2) Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N -  
(3) Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y -  
(4) Abandon N N N N N N N N Y  
3. Local Government 
(5) Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y -  
State Xumber 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Table 5.4: Equilibria of the Sub-Models 







Ry GMR, SMR, SEQ, LI - Lloy NM 
R, GMR, SMR, SEQ, LI - Lio, NM 
R, GMR, SMR, SEQ, Li - Lio,NM 
5 A.2 Hypeîgame Analyszs 
Hypergarnes are modeling structures that incorporate information about misper- 
ceptions. A rnisperception can be related to the preferences of DMs, the available 
options of DMs, or even the relevance of a particular DM's role in a conflict model. 
An effective model of hypergames for use with conflict resolution has been developed 
I>v Wang et al. [88]. 
Hypergame analysis is a u s e N  tool in strategic conflict. It can help a DM in 
assessing the possibly favorable effect of a rnisperception caused by his or her inten- 
tional bluffing, or in eduat ing  the negative impact of a misperception occumng 
iic:ciclentally through a lack of communication. 
The most common misperception is misperception of preferences. In this case, 
clifferent models can be built using GMCR II's MD1 design. Similar to sensitivity 
analysis, only nominal effort is usually needed to establish a new model from the 
original. The stability results of different models can then be compared. In this 
case. the comparison is easier because these models share the same list of feasible 
states. In the case of misperception related to a d a b l e  options of DMs, or even 
hie roie of some DMs, the comparison can be more cornplicated due to differences 
iii the sets of feasible states. Currently the user must Iine up comparable states. 
-1 future implementation of GMCR II should consider a genuine incorporation of 
hypcrgame analysis in which different misperception models c m  be analyzed in a 
same document and the alignrnent of comparable states is automated. 
A new type of misperception that can a~& in the context of GMCR II is the 
misperception of a DM's behavior pattern. In this case, equilibrium results hoom 
different stability type specifxations based on this misperception can be compared. 
Since this type of hypergame analysis does not interfere the modeling stage, it can 
be readily carried out in a same session upon provision of cornparison facilities. The 
appropriate use of hypergame analysis in GMCR II has yet to be studied carefully. 
5.4.3 Dynarnzc Analyszs 
A strategic conflict can evolve over time. The goals and preferences of a DM can 
tisiially be established at a particular time, but changes could occur due to either 
revealed information or the effects of exogenous events. A form of dynamic analysis 
siiggested in [65] to account the effects of exogenous events can be rea dily used in 
;i DSS such as GSICR II. An imaginary DM n m e d  Taturen or "EnvironmentY, 
n-ith no preferences but rather with control over exogenous events can be included. 
Other DSIs' preferences, expressed in option prioritizing or option weighting, could 
I)worne dependent on the event option. For example, an "Environment" DM, who 
(+ont rols an event option "found more contamination evidence" could be introduced 
iiito the Elmira model. Then the possible changes of each DM'S preferences due 
r o  that event can be integrated into the option-based preference specifications, 
siicli that surprise could be avoided. However, dynamic analysis in this format is 
;ipplicable only in option form. 
Chapter 6 
Output Presentation and 
Int erpretation 
6.1 Output Information from Stability Analysis 
Tlie analpis engine of GMCR II generates a vast amount of output data - infor- 
[nation about the stability of each state for each DM under a variety of solution 
m n r ~ p t s .  Figure 6.1 shows the organization of stability results in the output data 
siil~systern. The three dimensional structure of Figure 6.1 can be interpreted in a 
\ïi rie ty of ways, including: 
1. For each DM, the DM'S plane (pardel to the STATE/STABILITY TYPE 
plane) indicates the stability or instability of each state under each possible 
stability type for that specific DM. 
2. For each stabiüty type, the stabàiity-type plane (pardel to the DECISION 
1IAKER/STATE plane) provides a complete snalysis of the mode1 according 
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to that stabihty type. 
3. For each state, the stute plune (pardel to the DECISION MAKER/STABILITY 
TYPE plane) identifies aii DMs for whom the particular state is stable, under 
each possible stability type. 
4. The ST.4BILITY TYPEISTPirE plane itself, referred to as the equzlibrium 
plane, contains the projection of stability results for each DM, indicating al1 
equilibria for each stability type. 
-4s c m  be seen, complete stability information is produced by the analysis en- 
giiie. In practice, a user &en wishes to view the stability results in different 
iiianners. He or she may also wish to have some additional analyses based on the 
initial stability results, nhich would be very helpful for inspiring insights into deci- 
sioii problems. As a decision support system, GMCR II is intended to provide DAIS 
iintl analysts with decision advice, structural insights, and anmers to ' that  if?" 
qwstions. This goal cannot be fully achieved without an interactive presentation 
of the analysis results. The following subsections discuss and illustrate how the 
stal~ility results are presented and utilized in GMCR II in order to better achieve 
tlicl goal of providing useful strategic decision advice. The Elmira mode1 continues 
to he used as the illustration case. 
6.2 Displaying Equilibria and Stable States 
The Graph Mode1 methodology takes states as its basic building units while ignoring 
further details about their option representations. By doing so, the methodology 
offers more flesibility, because the states could be represented in formats other 
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Figure 6.1: Stability Results Structure [20] 
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than the option form, without any impact on the stability analysis. As a result, 
the output of the 1 s t  generation of this DSS, GMCR 1 [ZO], while possessing the 
same information as depicted in Figure 6.1, identifies a state only by the state 
tiitrnber, which is an arbitrady assigneci integer and provides no information at 
d l  about the nature of the state. GMCR II, however, takes option form as a 
major representation format of states fiom the modeling stage. In this case, when 
tlisplaying stability results, it is very important to associate a state with its option 
forin representation rather than just the state number, now that the information is 
availahle. Usually, a user wants to see as much information as possible on the same 
screen? and preferences of DYs are always essential for an understanding of decision 
c-lioiccs. Taking the above into account, the interface for displaying equilibrium 
st ates is designed as in Figure 6.2. Note that the interactive presentation of anaiysis 
r(~sti1ts allows the user to examine different aspect of the output, but does not alter 
t lie ~stablished conflict mode1 itself. Therefore, the display of output data takes the 
forni of property pages, rather than dialog boxes, except for those dialogs used for 
specifying user options. The property page for displaying individually stable states 
(iiiicler tlie tab "Individual Stability" in Figure 6.2) is very similar to uEquilibrium" 
page. escept that the "Coalition Stability" check box and A d d  Custom Type" 
Imtton are non-applicable, while a drop d o m  list appears for choosing the DM for 
whom the states are stable. 
A check box on the upright of this property page d o m  a user to specify 
whether he or she mants the equilibria to be shown in the order of a focal DM'S 
preferences. In Figure 6.2, this option is chosen, and a puil-down combo box d o m  
tlie user to specify the focal DM, which is Uniroyal in this case. The equilibrium 
states. as shom in option form in the upper area of this property page, are hence 
irinked from moût to least preferred based on the Uniroyal's preferences (refer to 
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Figure 4.22). If this box is unchecked, then the equilibria would be displayed simply 
according to the natural order of state numbers. In the lower part of this page, a 
check in a ce11 indicates that the state represented by the column is an equilibrium 
under the solution concept represented by the row. As a default, the equilibrium 
type for each solution concept that GMCR II analyzed (Table 2.1) is included. 
Mote that another pull-down combo box is used for the specification of the depth 
of Iimited move stability so as to better organize the dialog box and Save vertical 
space. The levels start at  2, because LI overlaps with Nash stability (R), and c m  
go up to 10 steps. 
As shonm in In Figure 6.2, in the Elmira model, stronger and longer term 
equilibria occur at States 5, 8 and 9, among which Uniroyal prefers state 8. Listing 
eqciilibria based on each DM'S preferences can give the analyst a clear overall picture 
of each DM'S intention, which is essential for he or her to better assess the decision 
situation. 
6.3 Displaying User Customized Equilibria 
Thc initial nin of the analysis engine determines the stability of each state for 
each DM for d l  the solution concepts listed in Table 2.1. However, as pointed 
out in Section 5.1.3, the applicability of a solution concept to a particular DM 
actually depends on the pattern of this DM'S behavior. As characterized in Table 
2.1, a solution concept is usually associated with the DM'S foresight, knowledge 
of preferences, and strategic risk attitude. It is very unlikely that ail the solution 
concepts listed are applicable to any particular DM. Therefore, the specification of 
applicable solution concepts for each DM is necessary. 
Since a solution concept may not be applicable for all the DMs involved, the 
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concept of equilibrium types must be generalized. Besides the traditional ones, 
many more equilibrium types can be defined by considering a state that is stable for 
al1 DJIs but under different solution concepts for different DMs. Since the GMCR II 
aiidpis engine calculates al1 individual stabilities for each state, no additional work 
iieeds to be done on the engine part. The problem can be addressed by providing a 
dialog box to allow the user to customize equiiibrium types by identifying desirable 
solution concepts For each DM. For example, if a state is Nash stable for MoE, 
SEQ stable for Uniroyal, and NM stable for Local Government, it dso constitutes 
;in eqttilibrium, even though it is difficult to narne its type. The introduction of 
(wstom-designed equilibria significantly generalizes the definition of equilibria. For 
marnple, s i th  up to a 10 limited-move level, a 3-DM conflict mode1 like the Elmira 
trioclel has 14 x 14 x 14 = 2744 distinct possible equilibrium types under this new 
concept, compared with only 14 choices originaliy. 
In Figure 6.2, the "Add Custom Type" button appearing at the bottom of the 
esisting equilibrium type list allows the user to speci& one more custom designed 
type each time. Upon clicking on this button, a dialog box (Figure 6.3) mil1 pop 
tip to allow the user to specifjr a customized equilibrium type by choosing an a p  
propriate (but not necessarily identical) stability type for each DM. For each Dhl, 
a corresponding drop list contains aii available stability types. This specification 
niethod is easy and straightforward. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates how the equilibria are displayed when three customized 
types are added. "(RQN)", for example, indicates an equilibrium type in which 
Sash (R) stability applies to the nrst DM, SEQ (Q) stability the second, and 
Son-myopic (N) stability the third. If a certain level, Say level 2 of limited-move 
stability is requested, L2 wil l  be used to indicate the choice in the brackets. The 
"Add Custom Typen now moves to the bottom of this updated list again, dowing 
Figure 6.3: Specifying a Customized Equilibrium Type 
more types to be specified. The user can also remove an undesirable type from the 
display. 
For a non-sophisticated user, an acronym like GMR or SEQ has little relevance. 
Studies are ongoing to design an on-screen questionnaire based on the attributes in 
Table 2.1 to help the user assign the most appropriate solution concept (s). 
6.4 Extract ing Commonalities . 
Some large real-world confIict models may have thousands (or even more) of fea- 
sible states, and a great number of equilibria may be identified. Under these ch- 
cumstances, it is useful to discover common features of the equilibria so that key 
information can be extracted. In option form, the common features can be either 
of first or second order: 
First order: -4 fmt order commonaüty refers to the consistent choice of one par- 
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ticular option, or not, over all equilibrium states. 
Second order: A second order commonality means that, for d l  the equilibria, 
their status on two certain options always follows a particular pattern. Hence, 
if a second order commonality exists on options rn and n, it means that one of 
the following situations has consistently happened on aiI equilibrium states: 
A) The status on option m is always the same as that on option n; 
B) The status on option m is always different to that on option ri. 
In Figure 6.2, the "Extract Commonaiities" button located at the upper-left cor- 
ner can bring up an information box which surnmarizes the commonalities found 
across the equilibrium states. There is no first order commonality among the equi- 
librium states in Figure 6.2. However, first order commonaüties may occur when 
the mode1 gets larger. The implementation of the discovery of first order cornmon- 
ality is relatively simple - just compae the status of each option in al1 equilibrium 
states. 
In Figure 6.2, state 9, as explained in Section 4.3.3, actually represents a group 
of indistinguishable states. The treatment of the "-3 has to involve some conven- 
tions. Hence, let us ignore this state in the equilibrium list, and observe al1 the other 
equilibria in Figure 6.2. It is easy to identify three second order cornmonalties, one 
of T-ype A and two of Type B: 
Type A commonaii~: The status on options 1 and 3 always coincides. Based 
on this, advice for MoE wodd be that a modification of the control order 
would tend to stimulate Uniroyd to accept it. 
Type B commonalities: 1. The Y-N status against options 1 and 2 is always 
different. Possible advice that can be drawn fkom this commonality for 
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Uniroyal is that once it seizes the initiative to delay, MoE would very 
likely modify the control order. 
2. The Y-N status against options 2 and 3 is almays different. The is actu- 
ally a "backgound cornmonalityn - a commonality applies to al1 feasible 
states - that is caused by the user's specification of mutual exclusive 
options (Section 4.3.2.1). 
Currently? it is up to the user's judgement to identify the "background common- 
l i t  However, development is ongoing to enable the system to filter out "back- 
ground" commonalites automaticaily. The easiest way to implement is to draw 
commonalites over the feasible state list and subtract them from the commonalities 
for equilibrium states. 
Cornmonalties of higher order can be defined, but generally increase comput- 
iiig complesity in implementation, while they may not provide much worthwhile 
ii~formation. Thus, they are not considered for incorporation into in GMCR II. 
6.5 Categoridng Equilibria into Patterns 
Tlie Elmira conflict is small in size, and a user can examine each equilibrium in- 
ditidually. Howveer, in a large-shed con£iict model, especially when the equilibria 
cannot be displayed on a single screen, a user may wish to specify each time a 
pattern representing, Say, favorable outcornes, and display al1 equilibria consistent 
nit h this specified pattern. 
In the Elmira case, for example, if the analyst believes that Uniroyal is concerned 
about Local Government's attitude toward the original Control Order, he or she 
may wish to take a close look at those equilibria in which, Say, Local Government 
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iiisists on the original Control Order. On the upper display area of the "Equilibria" 
property page, the column to the right of the options contains a spin button for each 
option, by which a "filter patternn can be specified such that only those equilibria 
matching this "filter" remain on the screen. In Figures 6.2 and 6.4, this filter is in 
its clcfault status such that ali equilibria of the specified types are shomn without 
further restrictions. In Figure 6.5, however, the pattern is set so as to request the 
-stem to show only those equilibria (compared with Figure 6.4) in mhich Local 
Government sticks to the original Control Order. The display updates instantly. 
R ernll t hat pattern specification using spin buttons is first rnentioned in Section 
4.3.2.30 and the pattern-matching technique (4.2,4.5), which is conveniently used to 
iniplement t his display feature, is extensively employed in the modeling subsystem. 
6.6 Request ing Follow-Up Analyses 
Tlie interactive output presentat ion illustrated in the earlier sections of t his chapter 
allows the user to examine many usehil aspect of the output as he or she desires. 
After utilizing these carefully designed features, the user should be in a better 
position to understand the implications of the stability resdts, and hence ready 
to go forth to take an even closer look in a more active manner. This section will 
clemonstrate how a user can request additional analyses, and hou7 these analyses 
can generate useN insights and decision advice, of course, provided the user's onni 
juclgement is used. 
Follonv.~p analyses are additional analyses that can provide further useful in- 
sights of a conflict after the initial nui of the stability andysis. -4mong those types 
of follom-up analyses descnbed in Chapter 5, sensitivity analyses, hypergame anal- 
ysis, and dynamic analysis require the establishment of additional models and need 
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to run separate sessions of GMCR II. In this section will concentrate on the other 
two follow-up analyses: coalition analysis and status quo analysis. 
6.6.1 Coalition Analysis 
Section 5.2 provides a new perspective on coalition andysis. In contrast to previous 
approaches, this new method is based on the impact of a coalition on the outcorne, 
iiistead of on similarity of preferences. A main objective of this new approach 
within the graph mode1 paradigm is to identify states that may appear to be stable 
on an individual basis, but that fail to be coalitionally stable. 
In the initial stability andysis, a state is an equilibrium if no individual DM has 
an incentiw to move away from it unilaterdly. However, a group of DMs might 
have both the motivation and ability to depart fiom an equilibrium. For example, 
state j. in the Elmira conflict is a strong equilibrium (refer to Figure 6.2 and Section 
2.2.3) - al1 unilaterd moves from it will lead to a state that is l e s  preferred by the 
DI1 who makes the move. However, a coalition of MoE and Uniroyal can move from 
t his equilibrium to state 8 (see Figure 5.4), and this move makes bot h members of 
the coalition better off. The equilibrium state 5 is, therefore, upset by the coalition 
more from 5 to 8 (also known as an "equilibrium jumping"). State 5 is said to be 
coalitionaiiy unstable, even though it is individually stable. This scenario a c t u d y  
coincides with what happened historicaliy [57,61]. The status quo in mid-1991 was 
state 1. Local Govemment shifted quickly to support the original Control Order, 
resulting in state 5 for a protracted intemai of time. Then on October 7, 1991, MoE 
and Uniroyal drarnaticaliy announced an agreement on a modiiied version of the 
original Control Order, thus moving to the equüibrium at  state 8. This agreement 
caught Local Govemment by surprise; its protests were to no avail, and it was 
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forced to reach a separate and quite unfavorable agreement with Uniroyal. 
In GMCR II, a user can request a coalition analysis on the existing equilibria, 
if necessary, to hirt her investigate coalitional stability. States t hat are equilibria 
on an individual basis but not coalitionally stable, such as state 5 in the Elmira 
Conflict, can be identified in the equilibrium List. In Figure 6.2, the "coalition 
stability" check box is turned on, and hence the coalition analysis is automatically 
performed over the equilibrium, and each equilibrium state that is coalitionally 
iinstable due to an ''equilibrium jumping" is indicated by a ce11 nith a "!" sign 
appeared at the first row of the lower display area. As c m  be seen From that figure, 
state 5 is singled out. The user has the option to ignore the coalition analysis by 
tinchecking the "Coalition Stability" check box. In this case, as can be seen from 
Figure 6.4, the row originaily use to indicate coalition unstability disappears. The 
GUCR II implementation of this type of coalition analysis related to L'equilibrium 
jumpings" is described in Section 5.2.3. 
6.6.2 Stutus Quo Analysis 
Statiis quo analysis can be used to find the possible evolution paths fiom the starting 
point (Status Quo state) of the mode1 to an equüibrium. The purpose can be 
to verify a predicted outcome (equilibrium) by examining the model's ïeach- 
abilil$' to that outcome, h m  the status quo; or, 
if the ansmer to the above is true, and 
- if the predicted outcome is desirable, explore possible plans of imple- 
ment ation; 
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- if the predicted outcome is undesirable, explore possible plans of devia- 
tion, in ways such as a "status quo switch" (Section 5.3) and "equilibrium 
jumpingn (Section 5.2). 
The Graph Mode1 is especially suitable for this purpose. An evolution path is 
not just a viable path in the integrated graph linking the status quo state and 
the equiIibrium under study; rather, the incentive of each DM to join the path 
Ixtsed on his/her behavior style is important. In the Graph Mode1 for Conflict 
Resolution, a more careful study is required for this purpose, since a variety of 
soliit ion concepts are involved. -4 natural assumption for a fundamental S tatus 
Qiio analysis is that each of the directional arcs that form the evolution path must 
be a unilateral improvement for a DM. 
Due to high computing complexity, it would be too aggressive to require the 
-stem to automatically identify al1 possible evolution paths from the status quo 
to t lie target equilibrium. Therefore, a stepby-step interactive approach to status 
quo nnalyis is adopted in GMCR II. Besides the computing feasibility, the extra 
I~~iiefits of this approach include user involvernent and the transparency of the 
process to the user, both of which are very helpful and thus highly welcome by a 
user. Figure 6.6 shows the user interface for status quo analysis. The left-most 
comho box allows the user to specify the state number of the status quo (which is 
1 in the Elmira case), either by choosing from the drop list, or by directly entering 
it. The status quo is the initial "source state". A 'knoven button is located to the 
right of the status quo combo box. Clicking on this button br inp up a "Moving 
Option3 dialog box as shown in Figure 6.7. The "Moving Optionsn dialog allows 
the user to speciîjr 
0 which DM(s) is considered h l v e d  in the m e n t  move - by using the mul- 
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Figure 6.6: User Interface for Status Quo Analysis 
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tiple selection list of options. In Figure 6.7, for example, ail three DMs are 
highlighted; 
whether to examine improvement only - via the "improvement only" check 
box. If selected, only U s  of single DMs, or group UIs of multiple DMs 
are considered in identifying possible target states of this current move; this 
option is actually recommended. 
whether to consider "equilibriurn jumpings" - via the "equilibriurn jumping" 
check box. This option is only applicable when a source state is an equilib- 
Mum. 
The first specification actually allows the user to specify a group H E N, and the 
second let the user choose to examine SH(u) or just S&(u). Of course, a singie 
DM or the whole set N is also a special case of group H. The third specification 
permits coalition stability to be considered in the course of status quo analysis. 
When the OK button is pushed, and hence the options are confirmed, the "Mov- 
ing Optioin" dialog box disapem. The system focus is back to the "Status Quo 
hualysis7 property page, and a new multiple selection list box, containing the state 
iiiiiiiber of di the possible target states can be reached by the specified current 
moves from the source state(s)? appears to the right of the current "Move" button, 
together with another %oven button to its right (Figure 6.6). In the Elmira model, 
the only state that c m  be reached from state 1, by individual or group UIs, is state 
5 (S&) = {u5)), which is an equilibrium and hence marked with a to its 
right. By the nmy, whether a state is considered an equilibriurn in this status quo 
analysis is based on the current equilibrium type setting in the b'Equilibrium" prop 
erty page. In most of the cases, there would be more than one item in this multiple 
selection list. One then can specify one or more items as  the new source state(s), 
Figure 6.7: Specifying Moving Options in Status Quo Analysis 
and then click on the new "hlove" button to specify the new current move(s), and 
so on. 
Table 6.1: Preference Ranking for the Elmira Confiict Model 
In the Eimira case, the only state in the list, state 5, is selected as the new source 
state. Since state 5 is an equiiibrium, the option "equilibrium jumping" in Figure 
6.7 for the new current move(s) becomes relevant and is selected. The uequilibrium 
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Figure 6.8: Integrated Graph of the Elmira Mode1 
to state 8. It can also be discovered that there would have not been an improvement 
from equilibrium state 5, were an L'equilibriurn jumping" not considered. Further 
attempts to move would find no way out. Once again, the integrated g a p h  of the 
Elmira mode1 and each DM'S preference ranking are reproduced in Figure 6.8 and 
Table 6.1 for ease of reference. 
This status quo analysis on the illustrative Elmira mode1 perfectly depicts how 
the conflict evolved (al1 based on reasonable judgements) . Initial predictions that 
are not viable are ruled out, and the remainder is confirmeci. The evolution path 
identified is exactly what happened historically [54, 57, 611. The newly developed 
coalition analysis is thus operational for the fmt time. Much more, could, of course, 
be done. For example, if the user wants to fmd out which DM(s) initiates the 
nrst move from the status quo to state 5, and which gmup possibly implements 
the *equilibrium jumping" fiom state 5 to state 8, he or she can trace it down 
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by narrowing the multiple selections in the moving options. Most of the analysis 
methods discussed in Section 5.3 c m  be facilitatecl by this interface. The user's 
necessary judgernents are significantly reinforced by the power and flexibility of this 
type of status quo analysis. The great potential of various usages of the status quo 
analysis to generate structural insights and decision advices is yet to be discovered. 
Depending upon a user's specification, the calculation of the set of target States 
I q -  a "cunent moven is basically related to individual UM, Gi(u) ,  individual UI, 
G'(u), group UI, G&(u), and the "equilibrium jumping". The definitions and 
implementations of these components can be found in relevant sections in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
Chapter 7 
Summary of Achievements and 
Future Research 
7.1 Research Contributions 
In this research: the author has developed a comprehensive decision support sys- 
rrm. G lICR IIo for systematically studying strategic conflicts, based on the Graph 
llodel for Conflict Resolution paradigm. Dunng the devetopment of t his DSS, new 
concepts in both the theory and the technology of confikt resolution were defined; 
rnodeling, analysis, and interpretation techniques were invented or improved; a 
range of efficient algorithms were designed and irnplemented to ensure that real- 
world codiicts can be effectively studied. As a result, GMCR II constitutes the 
nest generation of a strategic DSS that can provide decision makers and analysts 
d t l i  decision advice, structurai insights and answers to what-if questions. With 
this enhanced understanding, analysts can better explain strategic relationships 
and assist decision rnakers, who may have the opportunity to direct the evolution 
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of a confiict toward more favorable results. 
A lore specifically, the contributions of t his reseamh include: 
The user-centered design principles and user-friendly interface of GMCR II 
alIont users to interact with the systern effectively and efficiently, and make 
the systern widely accessible to both profesçionals and practitioners. 
The strength of option form is that it is more efficient and contains richer 
detailed information for a state, while the date-based graph model is more 
general and more flexible. An improved option form used in the modeling 
stage efficiently elicits user input and automatically generates the analytical 
g a p h  model that can be accepted by the analysis engine. This design ensures 
a loose coupling among the sub-systems of GMCR II: graph-based modeling 
or other nenr modeling approaches can be incorporated into the formulation 
subsystem in the future Nithout changing the analysis engine; rneanwhile, 
new solution concepts can be introduced into the analysis subsystem later, 
without altering the modeling stage. similar relationship exists between the 
analysis and interpretation subsystems. This architectural design provides 
this DSS Rith great adaptabiliw, Bexibility and potential for future improve- 
ment. and constitutes an innovative advance over the existing systerns for 
codict  resolution. 
To ensure a smooth coupling between the option form and the g a p h  model, 
the option form is improved, expanded in useful directions. In particular, the 
concepts of irreversible moves, forcing moves, and common moves are for the 
first time represented in the option form, which was earlier considerd to be 
almost impossible. 
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Specially designed data structures and conesponding algorithms are devel- 
oped to facilitate option-based modeling, such as generating possible states, 
removing infeasible states, coalescing indistinguishable states and calculating 
allowable state t rami tions, in a highly efficient rnanner. 
Systernatic approaches for ordinal preference elicitation are developed to ef- 
fectively elicit a DM'S relative preferences over states. Option prioritizing 
generalizes and improves the preference tree method such that unreasonable 
restrictions are removed. 
The efficiency of the analysis engine, which implements a ~ar ie ty  of stability 
definitions to model different human behavior, is greatly improved to en- 
siire t hat large scale real-world conflicts can be effectively analyzed. In fact, 
GMCR II analyses have been performed on the largest documented conflict 
model, the Trade in Service model, which was previously analyzed using Deci- 
sion3laker. The results perfectly coincide and GMCR II's performance proved 
to be superb despite the computing overhead caused by the extra features of 
the system. 
For the ht time it is pointed out in this thesis that the correct definition of 
an equilibrium should allow different stabiiity concepts be applied to different 
DlIs  in the same model. This concept actually provides a much richer variety 
of equilibrium types, and hence significantly contributes to the quality of 
decision support that the Graph Mode1 for Confiict Resohtion can offer. 
h novel approach to coalition analysis is presented, which emphasizes the 
impact on stability results of the potential coalition rather than preference 
similarity among coalition members. This approach has added a new dimen- 
sion to GMCR II, aad also provided a fiamework for a new research direction 
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of conflict resulut ion t heories and met hodologies; 
The concept of status quo analysis is significantly expanded and equipped 
with carefully designed interface, mhich greatly enhance the systeds ability 
to provide better structural insights and decision advices; 
Besides coalition analysis and status quo analysis, the use of GMCR II to 
carry out sensitivity analyses, hypergame analysis and dynamic analysis are 
illustrated. 
Informative presentation and interpretation facilities allow the user to bet ter 
cinderst and and ut ilize the analysis results; follow-up analyses facilit ies in- 
tegrated into the output presentation and interpretation subsystem provide 
the user with decision advice, structural insights, and m e r s  to "what-if?" 
questions. 
7.2 Future Challenges 
As pointed out by Sprague and Carlson [83], a DSS is an adaptive system which 
requires a unique iterative development approach. In contrast to the typical "pro- 
totypinc approach, the iterative development ubecomes the system" over time. A 
DSS needs to continue evolving to accommodate much dinerent decision environ- 
ments, behavioral styles and capabilities. Some opportunities for future research 
and development are as follows: 
Based on the hamework of the novel approach to coalition analysis introduced 
in Chapter 5, interesting research can be continued in two major directions: 
Fùst, research can be carried out to take into account counter-responses such 
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that a wide range of different Ucoalitional solution conceptsn c m  be definecl. 
To achieve this objective, reasonable assumptions must be set based on im- 
portant theoretical and practical assumptions. Secondly, the "enforcability" 
of a coalition improvement can be defined based on the sequential information 
of the improvement as well as each coalition member's solution concept. In 
other words, much more content could be added to the definition of coalition 
stability which nill make an important contribution to the theory of multi- 
party conflict resolution, thereby significantly increasing the performance of 
the related DSSs. 
The graph-based modeling approach proposed and outlined in Chapter 4 can 
be implemented in connection with the availability of suitable gaph-drawing 
development tools. The brand new modeling and interpretation method based 
on an interactive g a p h  display will brhg a revolution to the arena of decision 
support for conflict resolution. 
Cliapter 5 of this thesis explains that useful follow-up analyses, such as sensi- 
tivity analyses, hypergame analysis, and dynamic analysis, can be performed 
iising GMCR II, but currently they have to be done in separate sessions other 
ciian the original model. Further development should be c-d out to inte- 
g a t e  these analyses such that they can be more conveniently and effectively 
used in decision support under strategic uncertainty. 
Cognitive research should be conductecl on how to convey different solution 
concepts in a manner more acceptable for non-expert users. 
0 Section 4.4.5 demonstrates that there is no fundamental difbculty to incor- 
porate common moves into the option form modeling of GMCR II. However, 
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the representation issue haç to be address such that this can be actually im- 
plemented. 
a More empirical evaluation of GMCR II, especidy operational evaluation [79], 
cm be carried out. This evaluation will guide the future development of the 
system. 
The design of GMCR II, especially the loose coupling among the formulation, 
analysis and interpretation subsystems, yields the opportunities for new sta- 
hili ty types and new modeling and interpretation met hods to be incorporated 
into the DSS. 
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